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1. Introduction 
Our study of the French Front National faced two difficulties. The first was the 
recent split of the party in two, the former FN faithful to its founder and president 
Jean-Marie Le Pen, and another FN launched by the ex-delegate-general of the party, 
Bruno Mégret (see Darmon and Rosso 1999, Ivaldi 1999, Camus 2000). Relations 
between the two men were never easy but their rivalry took a sharp turn during the 
summer of 1998, when Le Pen decided that if he were to be declared ineligible by a 
court decision, and could not run in the European elections, the list of the FN would 
be led by his wife Jany and not by the delegate-general. Mégret publicly protested 
and appealed to the party base, calling for an exceptional congress to settle the 
matter, which took place in Marignane (23-24 January 1999). Mégret rallied two 
thirds of the party federations and was elected president of the new Front national-
Mouvement national (FNMN), while the historical FN went back to its former name 
Front national pour l’Unité française (FNUF). On May 11 though, through a court 
decision, Bruno Mégret lost the right to use the name „Front national“ and his party 
became the MNR: Mouvement national républicain.  
Since then the  two FN's have been involved in a fierce judicial battle in the courts, 
each claiming the exclusive right not only to use the name and the logo „FN“, but 
also its bank accounts, its real estate and the public funds it is entitled to as a political 
party. Presently, the winner is Jean-Marie Le Pen, since he was recognised as the 
only legitimate president of the FN by the court decision of 11 May 1999, and 
received the 41 million francs refund left over since the last elections, which were 
blocked because of the split. But their rivalry has clearly affected the electoral 
support of the extreme right. In November 1998, before the schism, a Le Pen list for 
the European elections drew 16 percent of the voting intentions, in the European 
elections of 13 June 1999, the Le Pen and Mégret lists put together drew 9 percent of 
the valid votes (Le Pen 5.7 percent and Mégret 3.3 percent), leaving the total score of 
the extreme right below its electoral level in the 1984 European elections (then 11.2 
percent). And if FN and MNR together pass the threshold of 10 percent of the valid 
votes in the departmental elections of March 2001, the figure is far below the FN’s 
score before the split (14 percent in the departmental elections of 1998). Meanwhile 
party members and officials are defecting, attendance to party meetings and 
demonstrations is dwindling, circulation of the extreme right press is declining. And 
for the coming presidential election of April-May 2002, Le Pen is credited with only 
8 percent of the valid votes, and Mégret hardly 1 percent.  
The second difficulty was to select the most appropriate material to study the ideol-
ogy of the FN before the split. Paradoxically there is currently no official journal of 
the FN, apart from its internal information letters restricted to the inner circles of the 
party  (Militant, the since 1985 La Lettre de Le Pen, now Les Français d’abord) and 
the review Identité launched to appeal to intellectual circles. In the past there were 
several attempts by the FN to create its own journal, successively Front national 
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(1973-1974), Le National (1974-1981) RLP Hebdo (1981-1984) and since May 1984 
National Hebdo, first presented as „official journal of Jean-Marie Le Pen“ (1984-
1987) then „official journal of the FN“ (1987-1988). But since 1988 it has dropped 
any reference to the FN.  This allows its editorial board to follow its own line, closer 
to the preoccupations of its readers, and  adopt a far more radical tone without com-
promising the FN (Camus 1996: 173 and Birenbaum 1992: 253-254). Since then the 
strategy of the FN has been to establish close links with a large range of  „friendly “ 
press supporters, representing different and often antagonistic currents of the French 
extreme right. Therefore a complete overview of the FN’s press should include at 
least five supports, National Hebdo (weekly) representing the national populist ten-
dency, Présent (daily) representing the catholic fundamentalist networks, openly 
anti-Semitic, Minute born at the time of the Algerian war and open to a larger radical 
right-wing public, Rivarol which is clearly  pro-European and most radical, and Iden-
tité, open to all the tendencies within the FN but taking more New Right positions. 
However, none of these newspapers is the FN’s official voice. In order to unify the 
various currents it brings together, the party, under the supervision of Bruno Mégret 
and his friends of the New Right, has made a special effort to put forward an articu-
late set of ideas forming the common ideological core of its propaganda and to dis-
seminate it among party members and the public. We therefore decided not to work 
on the press close to the FN but to concentrate on its programs and on the writings of 
its two leaders, Jean-Marie Le Pen and Bruno Mégret. We have also included the 
specific propaganda addressed at women by the women’s circle of the FN, the CNFE 
. 
 
2. Presentation of the French Front National 
 2.1 History 
 The National Front was founded on 5 October 1972 by activists of the nationalist 
movement Ordre Nouveau (ex-Occident), attempting an electoral come-back of the 
French extreme right. Discredited by the support given by many of its members to 
the German Occupation and the regime of Vichy, splintered into small factions, it 
had until then failed in its attempts to achieve parliamentary representation. The an-
gry shopkeepers' movement led by Pierre Poujade in the Fifties had its moment of 
glory, drawing as much as 11.6 percent of the votes in the parliamentary elections of 
2 January 1956. But two years later it was swept away by the Algerian crisis and the 
return to office of General de Gaulle. The de-colonisation process briefly re-
mobilised the extreme right on the defence of a „French Algeria“. But only  5.2 per-
cent of the electorate voted „No“ in the referendum of 8 April 1962 on the Evian 
agreements, confirming the independence of Algeria. In the first round of the 1965 
presidential elections the candidate of the „national right“, Jean-Louis Tixier-
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Vignancour, failed to gain more than 9.2 percent of the votes. All extreme right-wing 
movements put together hardly drew more than 100,000 votes in the 1967 parliamen-
tary elections and at the time of the 1968 student protests it was absorbed in the 
right-wing front against the „leftist“ peril. 
The creation of the National Front, four years later, inspired by the electoral success 
of the Italian neo-fascist party, MSI (Movimento Sociale Italiano), was explicitly 
meant to regenerate it1. It started as mixed federation of all its components,  includ-
ing those nostalgic for Vichy and anti-Gaullists, Poujadists and neo-fascists, intellec-
tuals and activists, under the leadership of Jean-Marie Le Pen. Some of the first to 
join, the elderly, had collaborated directly with the Germans. André Dufraisse and 
Victor Barthelemy, who gave the party its first structure, came from the collabora-
tionist PPF (Parti populaire français) of Jacques Doriot. Paul Malaguti, former re-
gional councillor of the FN, now deceased, also came from the PPF and had been 
implicated in the massacre at the villa Montfleury in Cannes, in 1944. Pierre 
Bousquet of the „Militant“ group belonged to the Francist movement of Marcel Bu-
card and served in the Waffen SS. Leading intellectuals of the party such as Roland 
Gaucher, former director of National Hebdo and one of its editors François Brigneau, 
belonged to the RNP (Rassemblement national populaire), the collaborationist party 
of Marcel Déat. Others were former Poujadists (M. Bouyer, J. Tauran) and monar-
chists (G.P.Wagner, J.F.Chiappe). But the majority discovered activism at the time of 
the Algerian war, in the numerous nationalist organisations fighting, sometimes vio-
lently and illegally, against the independence of Algeria - comités Tixier-
Vignancour, ARLP (Alliance républicaine pour les libertés et le progrès), the MJR 
(Mouvement pour la révolution), Jeune Nation, FEN, OAS-métro (Organisation Ar-
mée Secrète), etc. - or a little later, in the students anti-Communist movement at the 
end of the sixties (Occident/Ordre nouveau). Some of these groups were openly neo-
nazi (the FANE of Mark Frederiksen) or negationists (the GNR led by François Du-
prat, editor of the Cahiers européens), others were mainly anti-Gaullists and their 
members had sometimes fought against the Germans with the Resistance. 
Jean-Marie Le Pen was chosen as president of the new movement. Ex-paratrooper, 
former president of the nationalist students' association of Paris, the „Corpo“, elected 
deputy on the „Union et Fraternité française“ list led by Pierre Poujade in 1958 then 
on the list of the CNIP (Centre national des indépendants et paysans), campaign 
manager for the pro-Algérie française candidate Tixier-Vignancour, he had the ideal 
profile to unify such a disparate group: man of action, involved in all the battles of 
the extreme right, yet fairly politically respectable. 
Gradually, the FN has absorbed practically all the tendencies of the extreme right, 
from the Catholic fundamentalists led by Bernard Antony to the solidarists led by 
                                                 
1  Data on the formation of the FN and its members mostly comes from Camus 1996, Monzat 
1992 and Konopnicki 1996 
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Jean-Pierre Stirbois and members from more radical groups such as Militant or 
Troisième Voie. Today only small groups remain outside its orbit, groups which 
have split from the FN such as l’Alliance populaire or Espace nouveau, Monarchists 
of the NAR (Nouvelle Action Royaliste) or of the RN (Restauration nationale), more 
violent groups such as student activists of the GUD (Groupe Union Défense), 
l’Oeuvre française of Pierre Sidos, skinheads gathered around Serge Ayoub, alias 
Batskin,  or neo-nazis such as the PNFE (Parti nationaliste français et européen) of 
Jean-Claude Cornilleau, supporters of which have just been sentenced for the dese-
cration of the Jewish cemetery of Carpentras. None of these groups aims at parlia-
mentary representation. Many are connected with other neo-nazis or neo-fascist 
groups in Europe. Officially, because it is aiming at political respectability, the FN 
denies having any links with them. But individually there are many comings and 
goings back and forth, particularly among its more radical youth movement, the FNJ 
(Front national de la jeunesse) and the RE (Renouveau étudiant).  
The Nouvelle Droite also stands apart. The movement, a right-wing counter-culture, 
appeared in 1968, around the GRECE and its reviews such as Eléments and Nouvelle 
Ecole. Its guru, Alain de Benoist, founder of the review Krisis, who believes more in 
cultural warfare than in electoral strategy, openly disagrees with a party he considers 
to be racist and xenophobic, parochially nationalist, Catholic and populist (Taguieff 
1995, Telos 1994). But nonetheless, the Nouvelle Droite and its ideas have influ-
enced many leaders of the National Front such as Bruno Mégret, Jean-Yves Le Gal-
lou, Yvan Blot, Pierre Vial and Jean-Claude Bardet. 
2.2 Ideas 
The history of the French extreme-right goes back two centuries, with distinctive 
ideological traditions (Winock 1993). The first, born in reaction against the Revolu-
tion of 1789, is traditionalist, monarchist and Catholic. It failed to restore the Throne 
and the Altar but it was renewed at the turn of the XIXth century, at the time of the 
Dreyfus affair, with the launching of the Action française and the intellectual influ-
ence of its main thinker, Charles Maurras. At the same time a new nationalism - 
populist, anti-establishment and mass-based - was taking shape. Zeev Sternhell has 
labelled it the „revolutionary right“ and sees it as the fore-runner of fascism (Stern-
hell 1978). The anti-parliamentary movement led by General Boulanger (1886-
1889), the nationalist leagues of the thirties, the PPF of the former communist 
Doriot, or more recently the Poujadist movement, can all be put in that group. Al-
though the social, religious and economic values of the two traditions are radically 
opposed, they both are nationalist, authoritarian, xenophobic and anti-Semitic. 
For the first time in the history of France, a political movement like the FN has suc-
ceeded in bringing together these two tendencies and mixing their ideas, as shown by 
its last „Program for government“ (1993). Structured around the defence of national 
identity, threatened by immigration and the internationalisation of trade, it continues 
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the nationalism glorified in the past by Barrès and Maurras. Like them, it wants to 
defend France against its internal enemies, (previously Jews, free-masons and protes-
tants, now immigrants, mainly Arabs and Muslims) and external enemies (interna-
tional finance, offshore trusts, the forces of cosmopolitanism). Although anti-
Semitism never appears in the official writings of the party, it is latent in several 
comments of its leader about the „Jewish lobby“, the „gas chambers, a minor detail 
in the history of World War Two“, his pun about „Durafour-crématoire“ or the „dou-
ble-nationality“ of a Jewish minister such as Lionel Stoleru. Like these authors, the 
FN defends the traditional values and institutions in which French identity (family, 
army, authority, Catholicism) is rooted. 
But there is also a populist aspect in the ideology of the FN, more present since 1993 
and its electoral progress among the working-classes. Abandoning the ultra-
liberalism of its beginnings, it now displays more social preoccupations; pleading for 
minimum wages, a shorter working week, improvements in the civil servants' statute 
and defence of the social-security system. More than ever, the FN’s doctrine de-
serves the label „national-populism“, coined by Pierre-André Taguieff (1984). 
2.3 Voters and supporters 
For ten years, the ideas of the FN had no impact and its electoral results were close to 
zero. Torn by internal dissension, in competition with its rival, the PFN (Parti des 
Forces nouvelles) and its leader Pascal Gauchon, it initially suffered failure after 
failure. In the 1979 European elections,  the two organisations could not reach 
agreement for a joint list. In the 1981 presidential election, their leaders could not 
manage to find the 500 signatures of elected representatives necessary to run for the 
presidency. In the following parliamentary elections, National Front candidates drew 
less than 0.2 percent of the votes. The conclusion of a book on L’extrême droite en 
France, published in autumn 1983, was that the French extreme right was dead (Pe-
titfils 1983: 123). Yet a few weeks later, a local by-election in the small town of 
Dreux marked its rebirth (Gaspard 1990). On 4 September 1983, the list, led by the 
National Front’s secretary general Jean-Pierre Stirbois, made a good score of 16.7 
percent in the first round. In order to defeat the left in the second round, a joint 
UDF/RPR/National Front list was formed, which won the election with more than 55 
percent of the votes in the second round. The alliance with the moderate right, widely 
debated in the media, provided the National Front with the political legitimacy and 
the visibility it longed for. In the following weeks, other by-elections confirmed the 
electoral growth of the Le Pen party, in Aulnay-sous-Bois where it drew 9.3 percent 
of the vote and in the second district of Morbihan (12 percent). A year later, in the 
1984 European elections, more than two million voters supported the list of the 
„ Front d’opposition nationale pour l’Europe des patries “ (11.2 percent of the valid 
votes), sending ten deputies to the European parliament. In the parliamentary elec-
tions of 1986, as many as 35 National Front National deputies were elected to the 
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National Assembly. Although their number, owing to the changes in electoral law 
(see infra, Annexe 1, a brief presentation of the French electoral system) dropped to 
1 in 1988 and zero in 1993, the scores of the FN have remained above 10 percent of 
the votes ever since, reaching the historical record of 15 percent and more than four 
million and a half voters in the last presidential election. 
At local level the FN’s progress was more difficult in a country with more than 
36,000 communes, three quarters of which are tiny (less than 700 inhabitants). Yet in 
the 1992 regional elections 239 FN regional councillors were elected and in the first 
round of the 1995 municipal elections, although the FN made a total score of only 
4.3 percent, it went up to 11.57 percent in towns of more than 30,000 inhabitants and 
in the second round conquered the town halls of Orange, Marignane and Toulon, a 
large city with more than 100,000 inhabitants. Then in a by-election in January 1997, 
Catherine Mégret, the wife of Bruno Mégret, became mayor of Vitrolles. Today the 
FN has more than one thousand elected local representatives. 
In addition, the influence of Jean-Marie Le Pen goes way beyond his electorate. 
Whether or not they vote for him, between a quarter and a fifth of the French of vot-
ing age expressed agreement with his ideas, at least before the party split, this pro-
portion being even higher on immigration issues, law and order and defence of tradi-
tional values (respectively 24, 29 and 30 percent in April 1998) 2. Even if only a mi-
nority of the population openly agrees with Le Pen’s ideas, a majority of French vot-
ers actually shares them, agreeing that there are „too many immigrants“ or that in 
France, „one does not feel at home as one did before“ (59 percent and 44 percent in 
the 1997 post-electoral CEVIPOF survey). On a scale of ethnocentrism, just over 
half the French of voting age had a medium or high score in 1997, and one out of 
five a very high score (Mayer 1999:270). 
2.4 Party structure and networks 
The second factor benefiting the National Front is the internal political resources it 
has managed to mobilise; not only the charisma of its leader and his ability to use the 
media to his advantage, but also organisational resources. After the 1988 presidential 
election, it consolidated its electoral gains by turning its initial activist group into a 
structured organisation of nearly 50,000 members. Candidates are no longer recruited 
by  small ads in the press, they are selected and groomed within party schools and 
display increasing professionalism. Beyond party members and voters, a social 
movement is in formation, a small counter-society sharing common values and sym-
bols with the grassroots in all segments of the population (Birenbaum 1992: 220-
                                                 
2 Sofres/Le Monde/RTL, 21-24 April 1998, sample representative of the French population age 
18 and over (N=1000). But since the split, the influence of the FN’s ideas has sharply de-
clined: in May 1999, only 11 percent of French voters said they agreed with Le Pen’s ideas 
and 9 percent with Mégret’s ideas (Sofres/Le Monde/RTL survey, 27-29 April 1999, 
N=1000) 
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286). A diversified press (National Hebdo, Présent, Le Choc du Mois now defunct, 
Minute) and a network of circles extend the party's influence. The oldest is its youth 
group, the Front National de la Jeunesse (1974) which is active in high schools and 
certain universities and at one point claimed up to 15,000 members (the real figure is 
closer to two or three thousand). Other organisations recruit among  women (Cercle 
national des femmes d’Europe), veterans (Cercle national des combattants), 
businessmen and professionals (Entreprise Moderne et Libertés), farmers (Cercle 
national des agriculteurs) etc. The party’s Scientific Council and the review Identity 
are designed to appeal to intellectuals. Fundamentalist networks, among them pro-
life groups (SOS Tout Petits, Laissez les Vivre) are very active and are aimed at 
Catholics. They are connected with the NF via one of its leaders, Bernard Antony, 
who founded the Centres Charlier and the Comités Chrétienté-Solidarité (Golias 
1991, Camus and Monzat 1992). The pro-Saddam positions taken by Jean-Marie Le 
Pen during the Gulf War have drawn in members from more radical groups of the 
extreme right such as Troisième Voie or l’Oeuvre française, while the club Renais-
sance serves as a bridge with the moderate right. After the social movements of De-
cember 1995, the FN has also tried to promote its own unions, among the police, 
among prison guards and among bus and subway workers, as well as organisations 
designed to help the unemployed (such as Fraternité Française)(Soudais 1996). 
2.5 Political opportunities 
The National Front’s rise also benefited from specific political opportunities. One of 
the key factors in its success was the election of a socialist President of the Republic 
and the nomination of four communist ministers in the government of Pierre Mauroy 
in 1981, after twenty three years of right-wing government. Firstly, the „socialist-
communist“ victory radicalised some right-wing voters and then two years later, 
many former left-wing adherents were alienated by the change in the social and eco-
nomic policies of  the Left, considerably increasing the number of potential voters 
for the Le Penist party. The rapid turnover in office of right and left-wing govern-
ments, the „cohabitation“ between a socialist president and a RPR Prime Minister 
(1986-1988), the lingering recession and a succession of affairs and scandals, con-
tributed to discrediting the political class as a whole and to a blurring of the left-right 
division, giving strength to Jean-Marie Le Pen’s attacks against the mainstream par-
ties, which he ironically nicknamed „The Gang of Four“ : The Communist Party 
(PC), the Socialist Party (PS), the Union for French Democracy (UDF) and The 
Rally of the Republic (RPR). More deeply perhaps, as suggested by Piero Ignazi, this 
vote was a reaction against post-materialist values and the permissiveness of the Six-
ties, a „silent counter-revolution“ (Ignazi 1992). 
The FN also benefited from the direct help of its opponents several times. As we saw 
above, the electoral alliance proposed by the UDF and the RPR to the National Front 
in Dreux, because no victory over the Left would be possible without the votes of 
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National Front supporters, pulled it out of the electoral ghetto where it had been con-
fined. This policy of alliances continued on a large scale in the 1986 regional elec-
tions. It lasted until after the electoral collapse of the Left in the 1992 regional elec-
tions, when the Right no longer needed the extreme-right to be victorious. It started 
anew in the 1998 regional elections, when the UDF presidents of four regions were 
elected with the support of National Front representatives. The Left also contributed 
to the development of the Le Penist party, using it to weaken the right. It was respon-
sible for changing electoral law just before the 1986 parliamentary elections. Propor-
tional representation, more favourable to small parties than the majority system, lim-
ited the losses of the Socialist Party but also enabled 35 National Front deputies to be 
elected to the National Assembly. It also divided the moderate right on the question 
of whether to make local alliances with FN candidates. Since 1988, the majority sys-
tem has been restored but, on the left as well as on the right, the idea periodically 
reappears that it is not democratic to thus deprive a party of parliamentary 
representation and that the system should be reformed mixing the majority system 
and proportional representation, giving small parties at least minimum represen-
tation.    
3. Women voters and women candidates 
3.1 Women voters  
Since the first electoral successes of the National Front, its low proportion of women 
voters has been a constant in French elections. In the nine general elections between 
1984 and 1997, the National Front has repeatedly had a deficit of female voters. The 
number of women who vote for the party has varied between seven and thirteen per-
cent, whereas it ranges between eleven and eighteen percent among male voters. The 
gender gap has varied over time from a minimum of one point in the parliamentary 
elections of 1993 to a maximum of seven points in the 1995 presidential election. 
Nevertheless, in a disturbing development for the future, the advance of the National 
Front in the last four parliamentary elections has included an increase in women vot-
ers, though the increase was three points compared to seven for men  (Table 1). And 
the survey data after the European elections of June 1999 is, at first sight, even more 
startling. For the first time, it shows no difference between male and female support 
for the extreme right (Table 1). Closer examination, though, shows that between the 
1994 and the 1999 elections, the proportion of women supporting the FN has re-
mained stable, at the level of 9 percent (if one adds the scores of Le Pen and Mégret 
in 1999). In the specific context of these European elections, with a low level of 
turnout and a large number of competing lists (twenty) that favoured protest voting, 
it is the male voters who dropped the FN (8% compared with 12% in 1994), mostly 
in favour of the two other anti-European lists led by Charles Pasqua and Philippe de 
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Villiers on the one hand, and the hunters list (Chasse Pêche Nature et Traditions) on 
the other. Women voters remain as reluctant as before to support the extreme right. 
Taking the National Front electorate as a whole, its masculine character can be 
measured in another manner. The last two general elections of 1995 and 1997 show 
that for every 100 National Front voters 60 are men and 40 are women (Table 2). The 
electoral base of the National Front is the opposite of that of the Green Party, which 
is mainly female. Hans-Georg Betz (Betz 1994: 143) has underscored the fact that in 
all European countries where there has been a concomitant growth of populist and 
ecological parties, the first have proved to be predominantly male in their composi-
tion while the latter are very female (Table 3). 
Two hypotheses can explain the reticence of French women to vote for the extreme 
right. The first is that in refusing to vote for the National Front, they manifested their 
hostility towards an ideologically sexist party, one of whose explicit objectives is to 
perpetuate gender hierarchy. In effect, the National Front’s program, characterised by 
an authoritarian paternalism (cf. infra V) offends the most elementary of feminist 
principles. Why would women vote for a party that is militantly against the rights 
won at the price of so many battles: the right to work, the right to interrupt an un-
wanted pregnancy? The anti-Lepenism of women can also be explained - and this is 
the second hypothesis supported by all the polls - by their refusal to accept violence 
(Mayer 1999: 117-132). They object to the physical aggression of the movement 
which is constantly ready to surface and frequently seen in numerous strong-arm 
operations. Women also refuse to join the verbal brutality of Jean-Marie Le Pen, 
whose speeches are peppered with „references to an aggressive virility“(Perrineau 
1997: 105) and whose rhetoric functions on the basis of „sexual metaphors“ (see in-
fra, section V.2). 
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Table 1: The Front National vote by gender: 1984-1999 (%) 
Elections 1984 
Eur. 
1986
Parl.
1988 
Pres.
1988 
Parl. 
1989 
Eur. 
1993
Parl.
1994 
Eur. 
1995 
Pres. 
1997
Parl.
1999 
Eur. 
FNMN 
Women   8   9 11   7 10 13 9 12 12 6 3 
Men 14 11 18 12 14 14 12 19 18 5 3 
Together 11 10 14.5 10 12 13 10.5 15.5 15 6 3 
Gap 
W/M 
  - 6 - 2 - 6 - 5  -  4   - 1  - 3   - 7  - 6 1 0 
Source: post-electoral Sofres surveys 
Table 2: Composition by gender of the NF electorate (%) 
 1984 
Eur. 
1986 
Parl. 
1988 
Pres. 
1988 
Parl. 
1989 
Eur. 
1993 
Parl. 
1994 
Eur. 
1995 
Pres. 
1997 
Parl 
Women 32 47 39 39 43 50 42 40 40 
Men 68 53 61 61 57 50 58 60 60 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: post-electoral Sofres surveys.  
Table 3: The gender basis of radical right wing populist and left libertarian parties (%) 
 SWEDEN 
(1991) 
 
ITALY 
(1992) 
AUSTRIA 
(1990) 
SWITZ. 
(1991) 
FRANCE 
(1997) 
GERMANY
(1989) 
 ND LN FPÖ AP FN REP 
Women 38 49 40 46 40 36 
Men 62 51 60 54 60 64 
 GREENS GREENS GREENS GREENS GREENS GREENS 
Women 69 - 58 54 59 53 
Men 31 - 42 46 41 47 
Source: Betz H-G, Radical Right Wing Populism in Western Europe (1994: 143).
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3.1.1 The sociological reasons3 
Sociological analysis - based on a poll conducted between the two rounds of the 
1997 parliamentary elections - helps us to understand the reasons for women voters 
rejection of the National Front (Tables 4 - 9). Women who vote least frequently for 
the Front belong to two groups with very different sociological profiles. The first 
group consists mostly of women who can be considered privileged and who are at-
tuned to feminist and modernist values. 6 percent of women with a higher level of 
education vote for the National Front (compared with 17 percent of men), 3 percent 
of women professionals or high-level executives (men 13 percent), 9 percent of fe-
male students (against 15 percent) and 10 percent of women who condemn the mas-
culine monopoly of politics (men 16 percent). In contrast, the second group of 
women whose support for the National Front is weakest is made up of women with 
traditional profiles: 65 years or older (6 percent vote for the National Front compared 
with 20 percent of male voters), practising Catholics (3 percent compared with 16 
percent), retired  women (6 percent compared with 22 percent) and widows (9 per-
cent compared with 26 percent). 
Hard core resistance to the National Front thus allies the extreme fringes of the 
women’s vote. On the one hand it includes the most dynamic faction of the feminist 
electorate which, in differentiating itself from the National Front vote, signals its 
hostility to the patriarchal ideology of a party founded on the inferiority of women 
and the superiority of the „virile“ man who is called upon to affirm his domination 
over family, society and politics. On the other hand it includes traditional and Catho-
lic women voters, who signal their rejection of violence and the radicalism of the 
National Front’s discourse. Rejection of the patriarchal order from feminists, rejec-
tion of violence from traditionalists: it is the conjunction of these two opposites that 
constitute the strength of the feminine anti-Lepenism. 
 
3.1.2 Working women:  an antidote against voting for Le Pen ? 
Electoral geography shows us that the Le Pen vote is strong in the departments where 
fewer women work (Nord-Pas-de-Calais, Lorraine, Alsace, as well as the depart-
ments bordering on the Mediterranean); that is to say, where traditional values about 
gender roles prevail. Conversely, the areas where the Le Pen vote is weak correspond 
to departments where the number of working women is high (Soudais 1966: 88, 
Mayer 1997: 444). This fact has led some to conclude that the best antidote to voting 
for Le Pen is a large female working population. Yet, if one analyses the individual 
electoral behaviour of women, paradoxically, the women most inclined to support the 
NF are working women! 14 percent of gainfully employed women voted for the NF 
in the 1997 election but only 6 percent of retired women, 10 percent of unemployed 
                                                 
3 The following analysis is mostly drawn from Sineau 2000, „L’électrice paradoxale“ 
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women and 9 percent of women students. The only exception to the rule was house-
wives who had worked in the past (22 percent) (Table 6). This can be explained in 
two ways. On the one hand, women who have never worked are to a high degree 
Catholic. The political effect of not working can be said to be counterbalanced by the 
effect of Catholicism, which is a powerful element of resistance to the National Front 
(see infra). On the other hand, women who formerly worked - less numerous among 
practising Catholics - have frequently been left behind economically. Having failed 
to re-integrate into the labour market, they are inclined to vote for the National Front 
out of social desperation. 
 
Table 4: The FN vote by gender and age (%) 
AGE Men Women Gap 
18-24 years 19 14  5 
25-34 years 20 18  2 
35-49 years 15 15  0 
50-64 years 22 10 12 
65 and over 20 6 18 
Source: Sofres/Libération/CEVIPOF survey, 26-31 May 1997, N = 3 010  
 
Table 5: The FN vote by gender and profession (%)  
PROFESSION Men Women Gap 
Farmer   4   0   4 
Shop-owner, craftsman, 
company manager 
26 11 15 
Executive, professional 13   3 10 
Middle management 14   8   6 
White-collar workers 25 14 11 
Blue-collar workers 24 25   1 
Source: Sofres/Libération/CEVIPOF survey, 26-31 May 1997, N = 3 010  
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Table 6: The FN vote by gender and type of activity (%) 
TYPE OF ACTIVITY Men Women Gap 
Employed 17 14 3 
Unemployed 24 10 14 
Retired 22 6 16 
Housewife (has worked) - 22 - 
Housewife (never worked) - 13 - 
Student 15 9 6 
Source: Sofres/Libération/CEVIPOF survey, 26-31 May 1997, N = 3 010  
 
Table 7: The FN vote by gender and education level (%) 
EDUCATION  
LEVEL 
Men Women Gap 
Primary 21 13   8 
Primary superior 22 18   4 
Baccalaureate 13   6   7 
Bac. + 2 years 12   4   8 
University  17   6 11 
Source: Sofres/Libération/CEVIPOF survey, 26-31 May 1997, N = 3 010  
 
Table 8: The FN vote by gender and religion (%) 
RELIGION Men Women Gap 
Regularly practising Catholic 16 3 13 
Irregularly practising 
Catholic 
15 11 4 
Non-practising Catholic 21 16 5 
No religion 18 16 2 
Source: Sofres/Libération/CEVIPOF survey, 26-31 May 1997, N = 3 010  
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Table 9: The FN vote by gender and marital status (%) 
MARITAL STATUS Men Women Gap 
Married 17 11   6 
Cohabiting 19 22   3 
Single 19 12   7 
Divorced 29 15 14 
Widowed 26   9 17 
Source: Sofres/Libération/CEVIPOF survey, 26-31 May 1997, N = 3 010  
3.1.3 Catholicism as a moral rampart against the National Front vote 
In a Catholic country such as France, one could have expected practising Catholics to 
support the FN, because this party contains a strong Catholic fundamentalist wing. 
However, this is not the case. In fact, fundamentalist Catholics are a very small ex-
tremist minority which has been repeatedly condemned by the official authorities of 
the Catholic Church and feared by the majority of its flock. The CEVIPOF 1997 sur-
vey shows that the religious integration of women has a decisive influence in their 
choosing not to vote for the National Front. The percentage of their vote for that 
party diminishes as their level of religious integration increases, dropping from 16 
percent among the non-religious and non-practising Catholics to 11 percent among 
those who irregularly go to church and 3 percent among those who are regular 
church-goers (Table 8). In contrast, among men, the degree of integration into Ca-
tholicism has almost no effect on their voting behaviour. In order to understand why 
religious values reduce the National Front vote among some and not among others, it 
is necessary to refer to the asymmetry of the values instilled in both sexes by the 
Catholic Church. Men are taught virility, strength and authority. Women are taught 
obedience, gentleness and dedication to others. This explains why Catholic education 
has acted on the feminine conscience as a propagator of a humanist morality opposed 
to a party that openly ridicules those values. 
3.1.4 Towards an increasing National Front audience among women? 
The voting behaviour of French women contains a paradox. In effect, throughout the 
years women voters have continued to resist the attraction of a vote that is for men 
frequently an outlet against economic difficulties (a quarter of unemployed males 
voted for the National Front in 1997 compared with 10 percent of unemployed 
women), or problems of a personal nature (almost 30 percent of divorced men and 
more than a quarter of widowers voted for the National Front). Even though women 
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are more directly affected by the economic crisis4 and its resulting isolation, major 
causes of support for the National Front, they vote less frequently than men for Jean-
Marie Le Pen’s party. Is it nevertheless conceivable for the female electorate to be 
transformed and become privileged territory for the National Front (Jaffré 1998)? 
Two arguments point in this direction. On the one hand, there is an observable split 
among the different generations of women, a split that does not exist among men 
(Table 4). Among women of 50 and above, there is strong reticence against voting 
for the National Front, without doubt linked to strong religious beliefs. Only 10 per-
cent of women between 50 and 64 and 6 percent who are 65 and over have chosen to 
vote for the National Front compared with 22 percent and 20 percent respectively of 
men in the same age groups. The gender gap is thus very real among older and eld-
erly voters. In contrast, among those who are less than 50 years old, the vote for the 
National Front is more frequent and the disparity between men and women is small 
or even non-existent. Thus, in the 25 to 34 age bracket, 20 percent of men and 18 
percent of women voted for a National Front candidate, while, among those between 
the ages of 35 and 49, 15 percent of both men and women voted for the National 
Front. 
The evolution of the working class vote is the second element suggesting that the 
Lepenist movement has already cut into certain areas of the feminine vote and could 
appeal to others in the future. While in the 1995 presidential election women workers 
distinguished themselves from male workers by a higher reticence in voting for Jean-
Marie Le Pen,  a quarter of women workers (like 24 percent of male workers) voted 
for National Front candidates in the 1997 parliamentary elections (Table 5). It is as if 
the economic crisis resulted in weakening (through unstable jobs, under-employment 
and lower salaries) this category of working women with few qualifications and a 
low education level. These women responded to right-wing extremism in order to 
express their desperation in the face of seemingly insurmountable economic difficul-
ties - a situation reflected in the fact that 82 percent of working class women are 
rather anxious about the future of their job (compared with 72 percent of working 
class men). The National Front vote among working class women is in this sense a 
vote of protest designed to draw attention to their undesirable position. 
                                                 
4 Today more women go to university and the number of working women continues to in-
crease, despite the crisis. Yet occupational inequalities between the sexes are still not a thing 
of the past. In 1998, the female unemployment rate was higher than that of men (13.5 percent 
compared to 9.8 percent), the gap persisting even for university graduates (unemployment 
rate of 8.5 percent among women, 5.4 percent among men). Women earn an average 20 to 27 
percent less than men. (For a similar degree, professional experience and qualifications, men 
between 30 and 45 have on average a 13 percent higher salary than women.) Women also 
more frequently work part time (31.6 percent compared to 5.6 percent) and more often have 
unstable work contracts (fixed term or temporary contracts). Last but not least, they are un-
der-represented in the upper reaches of the corporate hierarchy. See Margaret Maruani’s 
book on Travail et emploi des femmes, Paris, La Découverte, 2000  
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Interviews among women National Front voters suggest that their principal motiva-
tions in voting for the party are not radically different from those of men - immigra-
tion, crime and unemployment (Lévy 1989) - even if some women also cite reasons 
of their own such as defence of the traditional family. The CEVIPOF 1997 survey 
also showed that ideological motivations for voting for the National Front are the 
same among voters of both sexes - authoritarianism, nationalism and racism.5 How-
ever, the paradox of the woman’s vote for the National Front is that even when they 
are authoritarian, nationalist and racist, women are less likely than men to vote for 
the National Front, a party propounding those values. Among the nationalists (who 
define themselves as „French first“), only 20 percent of women vote National Front 
compared with 33 percent of men. On the other hand, it must be underlined that 
when they are National Front voters or sympathisers, women express an exaggerated 
adherence to the values of the party. For instance, 45 percent of women National 
Front voters and 55 percent of sympathisers define themselves as „French first“ 
compared with respectively 31 percent and 43 percent of men. 
3.2 Women candidates and elected officials 
When the National Front first began participating in elections, women candidates 
were not legion in the party. Today, the National Front presents more women candi-
dates (especially in local elections), conscious that they are best placed to preach the 
party’s word among women voters. In the French context, favourable to the femini-
sation of political life, the National Front has allowed itself be convinced that spe-
cific female qualities, or at least the qualities assigned to them by public opinion, can 
result in additional votes. It also knows that media coverage of certain elected 
women can soften the image of the party. „Persuaded of the moderating effect of 
femininity on politics,“ the extreme right party seems to think that „its ideas, as vio-
lent as they may be, are more acceptable when expressed by women “ (Venner 1999: 
421). 
3.2.1 Female National Front Members of the European Parliament 
It was in 1984 that the National Front entered the European Parliament with ten 
elected members after receiving about 11 percent of the French vote. „Everything 
begins today,“ Jean-Marie Le Pen declared at the time. The victory was facilitated by 
proportional representation, a veritable „blessing“ for emerging political parties. 
                                                 
5 Sineau 2000. Also Mayer (1999: 125), showing that basically one finds the same hierarchy of 
social, educational and ideological factors explaining the vote for the FN whatever the sex, 
with just one difference. Among men, there is a specific anti-feminist motivation. The more 
they are in favour of a traditional vision of gender roles, and against women’s emancipation, 
the more likely they are to vote for the FN. In contrast, women who vote for the FN are not 
motivated by a traditionalist vision of their role, once controlled by age, education and relig-
ion.  
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There were few women among the candidates put up by the National Front in 1984 
(13 out of 81, or 16 percent). In its official literature the party did not forget to men-
tion that the women candidates had children. Out of the 13 female candidates, nine 
were designated as „family women“, a laudatory title that came before their profes-
sion and their public office or political responsibilities. The National Front is the 
only party that presents the „maternal“ profile of its candidates in this manner, a 
demonstration of the importance that it accords the procreative function of women. 
Few in number, women candidates were poorly placed on the National Front’s elec-
toral lists (only one among the first ten listed candidates and three among the first 
20), which explains why there was only one woman, Martine Lehideux, a member of 
the party’s National Committee, among the 10 elected National Front candidates (ten 
percent). As a result, the National Front had fewer elected women than most other 
parties. On the left, the Socialist Party counted 30 percent of women among its 
elected officials (6 out of 21) while the Communist Party had 20 percent (2 out of 
10). On the right, the Rally for the Republic (RPR) had 20 percent of women among 
those elected from its lists while the Union for French Democracy (UDF) had 21 
percent. The average was 20.9 percent, or 17 elected women deputies out of a total of 
81 French deputies elected to the European Parliament. After his success in that elec-
tion, Jean-Marie Le Pen allied himself in Strasbourg (where the Parliament meets) 
with the five MEP's from the Italian Social Movement (MSI) and with the single 
deputy from the Greek National Political Union to create the „Group of the European 
Right“.6 Le Pen became the group’s president. Of the 16 members, Ms. Lehideux was 
the only woman. 
The 1989 European Parliamentary elections did not see any increase in the number of 
National Front women MEP's (Table 10). Ms. Lehideux remained the only woman 
representative of the National Front in the European Parliament. The place of women 
on the National Front’s list of candidates even declined in comparison with previous 
elections - there were only two women among the first 20 listed candidates. Badly 
placed on the list, Marie-France Stirbois violently opposed Jean-Marie Le Pen on the 
issue and declined to stand for election. As for Ms. Lehideux, she was listed second 
just behind Le Pen himself. If the elections of 1994 saw the number of National 
Front European deputies increase by one, the number of women deputies remained at 
just one. This time it worked against Ms. Stirbois, number six on the list, who later 
took her revenge for 1989. She has now become a well-known woman in the Na-
tional Front, accumulating numerous elected positions and political functions (then 
regional councillor of the Center Region, member of the departmental council of the 
Eure-et-Loir department, member of the municipal council of the city of Dreux and 
member of the National Front’s political committee). 
                                                 
6 The 1994 elections marked the end of this Group of the European Right; National Front rep-
resentatives now sit with the independents in the European Parliament 
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During the summer of 1998, Jean-Marie Le Pen supported the candidacy of his wife, 
Jany, to head the National Front’s list for the June 1999 European elections. Le Pen 
expected to be declared ineligible by the Versailles Court of Appeals as part of an 
ongoing lawsuit. Saying that „the candidacy of a woman of foreign European ori-
gin... would send a strong signal to women of European origin,“ he believed his wife 
capable of „contributing to the election of 20 to 25 Members of the European Par-
liament“ (Libération, July 22 and September 17, 1998). Moreover, he presented his 
replacement by his wife as a tradition of the National Front. „It’s true that in the Na-
tional Front we have a culture of the couple, a family culture, and that in the history 
of our families it is the women who take the place of men when they are at war or are 
unable to be there.“ At first reluctant to become involved („I am a homemaker... 
without any political training.“), Jany quickly changed her mind and said she was 
„proud“ that in heading the National Front’s list she „could contribute to redress the 
injustice against her husband“.7 The feared scenario of Le Pen’s exclusion by the 
court did not take place and the president of the National Front was able to head the 
list. Nevertheless, it was the announcement of Le Pen’s wife’s possible candidacy 
that precipitated the break with the National Front’s former delegate-general Bruno 
Mégret. 
As a consequence of the party split, two extreme right lists were competing at the 
1999 European elections. The Le Pen list included only one woman in the first ten 
names, Marie-France Stirbois (sixth on the list). Martine Lehideux came twelfth, 
with no hope of being elected. The Mégret list did not contain more women. There 
was only one in the first ten. On purpose, the president of the MNR chose Marie-
Caroline Le Pen (fourth on the list), the rebel elder daughter of the FN’s leader, who 
lives with one of Mégret’s close lieutenants, Philippe Olivier. The  second woman on 
the list, in twelfth position, was Mireille d’Ornano.  But Bruno Mégret's list, with 
less than 5 percent of the valid votes, had no deputies elected. And if Le Pen’s list 
drew more than 5 percent of the votes, the five elected deputies are all men. There 
are no more women representing the French extreme right in the European Parlia-
ment.  
3.2.2 National Front women elected to the National Assembly 
Representation of the National Front in the National Assembly is not favoured by the 
electoral system (majority voting in two rounds for a single member, instead of a 
party list) in use in the Fifth Republic - denounced by Le Pen as, „A system put in 
place in order to exclude us” (Soudais 1996: 11). The only parliamentary elections 
which took place under proportional representation, those of March 1986, showed 
                                                 
7 Interview with Agir, a National Front youth publication quoted by Libération, September 17, 
1998. Jany Le Pen, born Jeanne-Marie Paschos, has never been an activist. Her only official 
role — more an honorary than truly political one — is as president of the SOS Enfants d’Irak 
association, founded by Jean-Michel Dubois, member of the National Front’s political bureau 
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inversely that they favoured the National Front. Garnering almost ten percent of the 
votes (about 2.5 million), the party’s entry into the National Assembly was widely 
noticed. With its 35 elected deputies, it was even able to form its own parliamentary 
group. 
Of the 35 National Front deputies elected to the National Assembly for the first time, 
only one was a woman, or 2.8 percent of the group (Table 11). That score placed the 
National Front ahead of the Rally for the Republic (1.9 percent of women in its 
group) but far behind the other parties even though they hardly made any effort to 
place women candidates in constituencies where they could be easily elected. The 
left-wing parties had the highest proportion of women in the National Assembly. The 
Socialist Party had 9.8 percent of women in its group and the Communist Party 8.5 
percent. Even though more than 20 percent of National Front candidates were 
women, they were candidates in the most difficult districts, those that were „given up 
for lost.“ The only woman from the extreme right elected to the National Assembly 
in the 1986 election was Yann Piat, who was elected in the third district of the Var 
department. She was named secretary of the National Front’s parliamentary group. 
She was one of the party’s so-called „historical members,“ those who joined before 
1984, and she belonged to Jean-Marie Le Pen’s family circle. Yann Piat presented 
herself as the „spiritual goddaughter“ of the National Front president, whom she had 
known since infancy. She was also eminent within the National Front, having 
climbed the various steps of the political ladder. First responsible for the National 
Front’s section in Hyères-Toulon (1977 to 1983), she then became department secre-
tary for the party in the Landes department before assuming the same post in the Na-
tional Front’s Var Federation in the autumn of 1985. She was also member of the 
party’s political bureau. 
In the parliamentary elections of 1988, the National Front again obtained almost ten 
percent of the vote. Nevertheless, the group of elected National Front members 
shrank considerably as a result of the change in the electoral system. „The number of 
National Front deputies has been reduced from 35 to one, thanks to the two-ballot 
majority voting system, and the extreme right wing party lost a good deal of its po-
litical visibility."( Perrineau 1997: 58). Ironically for a party that elevates virility to a 
cardinal virtue, its only seat in that election was won by a woman, Yann Piat, who 
was re-elected in her Var department with 54 percent of the vote. It is true that she 
resigned from the party shortly afterwards, a break that she described in her book 
Seule, Tout en Haut à Droite. She later joined the ranks of the Republican Party (one 
of the components of the UDF), remaining a member until her assassination in 1994 
(Sineau 2001: 141-142). 
In November 1989, two by-elections placed two women in the political forefront. „In 
Marseille and in Dreux the National Front candidates Marie-Claude Roussel and 
Marie-France Stirbois obtained respectively 33 and 42.5 percent of the vote. In the 
second ballot, the first was narrowly defeated (47.2 percent) while the second was 
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triumphantly elected with 61.3 percent of the vote (Perrineau 1997: 63). In this way, 
from 1989 until the end of the legislative period (1993), the only deputy from the 
National Front happened to be a woman, a new paradox for a resolutely masculine 
party. The election turned Marie-France Stirbois into the „National Front’s show-
case“ and she played „on her image as a woman to gain maximum publicity“ (Du-
rand 1996:147). She was also able to claim an impressive record of personal 
achievements. Having first been elected to the party’s Political Bureau at the begin-
ning of 1990, she was re-elected regional councillor of the Center region in 1992 and 
headed the National Front’s regional group. 
Following the 1993 parliamentary elections the National Front, which obtained 13 
percent of the vote, did not have a single deputy in the National Assembly. Marie-
France Stirbois lost her seat from the Eure-et-Loir department, and though Yann Piat 
was re-elected from the Var department, it was under the UDF-PR label. The 1997 
parliamentary elections gave the National Front only one deputy despite obtaining 15 
percent of the vote, its highest score ever in a parliamentary contest. The winner was 
Jean-Marie Le Chevallier, mayor of the southern port city of Toulon since 1995, who 
was elected from the first district in the Var department. His victory, however, was 
invalidated several months later on the grounds that he had violated election cam-
paign laws, and he was declared ineligible to run for one year. As a result, Le 
Chevallier’s wife Cendrine aspired to succeed her husband in the by-elections that 
took place in 1998. In a contest against the Socialist Odette Casanova, Ms. Le 
Chevallier lost the seat won by her husband in June 1997 in the second ballot. As a 
result, today the National Front does not hold a single seat in the National Assembly. 
The new ”Gender parity law” of 6 June 2000 (see Annexe 2) obliges political parties 
to present an equal proportion of women and men among their candidates, and those 
which will not comply with this rule shall be fined. This should incite the FN and the 
MNR to promote more female candidates for the 2001 parliamentary elections. Yet 
recent declarations of their leaders suggest that the two parties plan different strate-
gies. While Carl Lang, secretary general of the FN, has announced (August 2001) 
that he intended to “enforce the law”, Jean-Yves Le Gallou, delegate-general of the 
MNR, was less affirmative, declaring that “the gender of the candidates is not the 
criterion” (L’Express, 16 August 2001). Like other right wing parties, the MNR may 
prefer to pay the fines than to promote women candidates.  
 
3.2.3 National Front women elected to Regional Assemblies 
As in the parliamentary elections of 1986, the National Front has profited from the 
electoral system that existed then for the election of the regional assemblies, that is, 
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proportional representation8. Since 1992, the National Front has established itself on 
all Regional Councils. The party confirmed its presence in the 1998 elections, with 
its score rising from 13.9 percent to 15.3 percent. In this last election the National 
Front made a real effort to place women in eligible positions on its lists. If the party 
played the feminisation card, it was due to the dynamics created by the Socialist 
Party in the 1997 parliamentary elections. The policy of quotas introduced with suc-
cess by the Socialists had a contagious effect on other political groupings, including 
the National Front (Sineau 1998). Fearful of an electorate wishing to see the renewal 
of its elites, the National Front resolved to give women prominent positions on its 
lists. Of the 95 department lists presented by the National Front in metropolitan 
France, nine were headed by women (including Ms. Stirbois in Eure-et-Loir, Ms. 
Lehideux in Paris and Ms. Myriam Baeckeroot in the Yvelines department). The 
election doubled the proportion of National Front women candidates elected to the 
regional Councils, increasing from 8 percent in 1992 to 17 percent (Table 12). The 
46 National Front candidates elected included Ms. Stirbois, Ms. Lehideux and Marie-
Caroline Le Pen, the eldest daughter of the party leader, who was elected regional 
councillor for Ile de France (Paris metropolitan region), an assembly that includes 18 
National Front officials headed by Ms. Lehideux. 
3.2.4 National Front Women elected to Department Assemblies 
The majority voting system for the election of the department General Councils 
represents the same handicap for the National Front that it does in parliamentary 
elections. This was proved by the 1985 elections. One year after its victory in the 
European elections, the National Front failed to establish itself in the departmental 
assemblies even though it presented a large number of candidates (exactly 
1,521)(Birenbaum 1992:61). Although it received a non-negligible 8.8 percent of the 
vote, the National Front was able to claim only one elected official, in Marseille (a 
man). In later elections there were more women candidates for department elections. 
From 357 in 1992, their number rose to 377 in 1994 and then to 427 in 1998. In 
1992, the National Front did not win a single seat. In 1994, three of its candidates 
were elected, including two women. Ms. Marie-France Stirbois was elected general 
councillor in Dreux (Eure-et-Loir) with more than 54 percent of the vote, while 
Eliane Guillet de la Brosse9 won in Toulon in the Var department. In 1998 the Na-
tional Front, which received 13.9 percent of the votes, had three elected general 
councillors. But in the elections of 11 and 18 March 2001, the FN and the MNR lost 
all the four seats they had, even though their total score was a little higher than in 
                                                 
8  In order to weaken the local influence of the FN, the electoral rule has been changed by the 
law of 19 January 1999 (see annexe 1), which adopts a mix of proportional representation 
and majority rule.  
9 Also town councillor of Toulon, she claims allegiance to the legitimist royalist branch within 
the National Front;  
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1994 in the same districts (10,8 percent -FN 7,1 percent + MNR 3 percent- instead of 
9,8 percent).  
3.2.5 National Front women elected to Municipal Assemblies 
The role of wives was particularly visible, and at times emphasised, in municipal 
assemblies. In the south-eastern cities conquered by the National Front in 1995 (Tou-
lon, Orange, Marignane) and in 1997 (Vitrolles), National Front couples exercised 
their functions together. The hierarchy of the sexes was generally respected: when 
the husband was mayor the wife was only a municipal councillor or at best a deputy-
mayor. When the woman herself was elected mayor, it was only to substitute her 
husband because he had been declared ineligible to exercise his function as a result 
of fraud. 
In Toulon (170,000 inhabitants), a city headed by J.-M. Le Chevallier, his wife, Cen-
drine, formed part of the municipal executive. She was the deputy for youth affairs 
and tried to „conquer minds“ through the „Youth of Toulon“, association founded 
just after the elections. In Orange (23,000 inhabitants), whose mayor was Jacques 
Bompard, his wife, Marie-Claude, appeared to have a strong influence over munici-
pal affairs even though she was not an elected official.10 She was, in any case, per-
ceived as the „real shadow of her husband in city hall"(Soudais 1996:54). 
Finally in Vitrolles, Catherine Mégret was elected mayor in February 1997 in place 
of her husband (as a result of Bruno Mégret’s having been condemned for spending 
more money than authorised for his campaign). Neither a party militant nor an 
elected official, she admitted having become a candidate „to represent Bruno“. „I am 
not a political woman, by which I mean that my primary ambition is not to exercise 
power.“ (Mégret C. 1997: 80). Journalists took pleasure in designating Bruno Mégret 
as the „consort mayor“ or as the „real-false“ mayor of Vitrolles in order to indicate 
that he was the head of that city through his wife, who was the incarnation of the 
„model of the figurehead woman“. 
The case of Vitrolles clearly demonstrated that the wives of National Front leaders 
are in reality directed by their husbands and their party. But there are many other 
„examples of wives, daughters, sisters or secretaries of the National Front enrolled in 
extremis to make up the electoral lists“ (Servan-Schreiber 1997:5). In fact, in the 
Guide du Responsable published by the National Front at the time of the 1995 mu-
nicipal elections, several pages are dedicated to „the use of family ties“. The book 
indicates many of the „tricks“ used to hide such ties, including the „systematic re-
course of using a wife’s maiden name“ (Soudais 1996:81). The role of women in 
politics as corrected by the National Front, a subordinate role dependent on the hus-
band’s career, was denounced on the left as well as the right by all feminists. „By 
playing the pale role of a stand-in, Catherine Mégret has first and foremost pro-
                                                 
10 Marie-Claude Bompard ran in the 1997 parliamentary elections 
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foundly offended the dignity of all women politicians,“ wrote Claude Servan-
Schreiber. Simone Veil (RPR) as well as Elisabeth Guigou (PS) were not mistaken 
when during a television program they qualified the conditions of the election in Vi-
trolles as an „insult to all women“11. 
 
Table 10 : Women among the FN European deputies (1979-1999)  
European 
Elections 
Elected deputies Women deputies % of women 
1979 0 0 0 
1984 10 1 10 
1989 10 1 10 
1994 11 1 9.1 
1999 FN 5 0 0 
1999 MNR 0 0 0 
Source: The French Home Office 
 
Table11 : Women among FN candidates and deputies in the National Assembly (1986-1997) 
 Candidates Deputies 
Elections Total num-
ber candi-
dates 
Women 
candidates 
%  women 
among 
candidates 
Number of 
deputies 
elected 
Number of 
women 
elected 
% of 
women 
 
1986 739 161 21.8 35 1 2.8 
1988 549 63 11.5 1 1 100 
1993 554 66 11.9 0 0 0 
1997 555 67 12.1 1 0 0 
Source: The French Home Office/ Gaspard, 1993 et 1997 (Metropolitan France) 
 
Table 12 : Women among FN regional councillors (1992-1998) 
Regional Elections Number of regional 
councillors elected 
Number of women 
elected 
% women elected 
1992 239 20 8 
1998 275 46 17 
Source: The French Home Office 
                                                 
11 TV Program 7/7 March 9, 1997 
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In the Municipal elections of March 2001, the FN lost the town of Toulon, but kept 
the town of Orange, whose mayor Jacques Bompard was even reelected after the first 
round, while his wife, Marie-Claude Bompard, made a very good score in Bolène, 
with 46,9 percent of the valid votes in the second round. As for the MNR, it kept its 
two towns, with the victory of Daniel Simonpieri in Marignane and of Catherine 
Mégret in Vitrolles, beating her adversary by a mere 200 votes. However the elec-
tions did not bring about a feminisation of the municipal team, as it did in most large 
towns with the dynamic of the “fifty fifty” parity law. On a total of 11 deputy may-
ors, Catherine Mégret chose only three women (27 percent )(Sineau 2001: 263-276).  
4. The work of the women in the party 
Even though the weakness of women’s activism is not unique to the National Front, 
it is pronounced within the party. In fact, assuring the political promotion of women 
has never been the party’s first priority, a situation consistent with its doctrine (cf. 
infra V). The social order as conceived by the National Front is based on the differ-
ence of the sexes - the men direct and command, in public as well as in private life. 
The women must obey and submit themselves to their biological destiny, that is, to 
have babies and raise them. Such an ideology, sexist in the first sense of the word, is 
based upon perpetuating the order of the sexes and is accompanied by speeches filled 
with openly expressed anti-feminism. In a supreme paradox, it is at times women 
party members who are charged with diffusing this militant anti-feminism, with the 
men acting on it through physical or symbolic aggression against women. In this 
manner, in May 1997, Jean-Marie Le Pen personalised hate against Catherine Traut-
mann, symbol of the resistance against the National Front in Strasbourg, by present-
ing a copy of her „head“ on a platter to militants (Fabre 2001: 110-111). During the 
1997 election campaign he molested a Socialist candidate, Annette Peulvast-Bergeal. 
The number of women militants and leaders in the party is low, today as in the past, 
even though its president tries to deny it. „There are many women at our public 
meetings and there are many who are members of the National Front.“ (Venner 
1999: 420). The few women who enjoy an important political role in the party fre-
quently belong to the family clan, either daughters, wives, or „god-daughters“ of the 
leaders. The party is an illustration in politics of the principle of „family preference“, 
an aspect similar to the clannish functioning of a party withdrawn into itself and that 
in practising nepotism exhibits an idea of the state and of politics that one could clas-
sify as pre-democratic. This „family partisanship“ also reflects the subordinate and 
secondary political role allotted to women by National Front leaders. The promotion 
of women is frequently the result of the husband’s career (cf. supra III)(Fabre 2001: 
108-109). 
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4.1 Women among party militants and leaders 
The National Front, which before its split had between 40,000 and 50,000 members 
(compared with 2,500 in 1984), does not give any indication of the percentage of 
women among its members. Female membership of the National Front, frequently 
perceived as a paradox12, is due to multiple motivations. These include believing one 
does not have a political alternative, respect of a family tradition, belief in a National 
Front discourse that explains the reasons for one’s everyday problems, following in 
the path of a man (father, brother, or husband) and even admiration of Le Pen’s cha-
risma (Orfali 1997: 137-138). 
Few at the base of the party, women members become even rarer as one goes up the 
party hierarchy. Since the creation of the National Front in 1972, women have al-
ways represented the smallest group among the national leadership in a party that 
practices „leader worship“ to a greater extent than others and has a pyramid, if not 
military, type of organisation in which „everything flows from the president“ (Sou-
dais 1996: 201). Low representation of women in the party’s leadership is therefore 
„desired“ by Le Pen. Elected by the party’s congress, he nominates the members of 
the executive bureau as well as 20 members of the central committee that make up 
the body along with 100 elected representatives. In December 1998, before the party 
split into two factions, representation of women in the party's national organisations 
was as follows: 
4.1.1 In the executive bureau 
In the executive bureau, the party’s power centre, there was one women out of six 
members, Ms. Lehideux, who is one of four party vice-presidents. A „founding“ 
member of the National Front (she joined the party when it was created in 1972), 
founder of the National Circle of European Women (cf. infra), she is one of Le Pen’s 
acolytes. An important figure in the party, Ms. Lehideux accumulated responsibilities 
and elected offices, belonging to the party’s political bureau and its central commit-
tee as well as heading the National Front group in the Ile-de-France regional council. 
4.1.2 In the political bureau 
In the political bureau there were three women out of a total of 44 members, or 6.8 
percent. In addition to Ms. Lehideux, the other women were Ms. Myriam Baecke-
root, who served as regional councillor in the Ile-de-France and department secretary 
in the Essonne department. She was also the wife of Christian Baeckeroot, a member 
of the party’s political bureau. The third woman was Marie-France Stirbois, who 
served as a European deputy, general councillor in the Eure-et-Loir department and 
as the National Front’s spokeswoman on women’s issues. 
                                                 
12 „Intruders, women are more stigmatised, not only by the men but by their fellow women who 
consider them traitors: to the feminist cause, first of all, and to the feminine identity“ (Orfali 
1997: 174) 
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Two of these three women were widows who succeeded their late husbands in the 
political bureau and who, to a certain extent, inherited their political weight in the 
party. Ms. Lehideux followed in the footsteps of her partner André Dufraisse (former 
member of the PPF, a pre-war fascist party and intimate friend of Jean-Marie Le Pen) 
who was a member of the political bureau until his death in 1994. Ms. Marie-France 
Stirbois also followed in the footsteps of her late husband, Jean-Pierre Stirbois, the 
party’s former „strongman“ who died in an accident in November 1988.13 Even 
though entering political life through marriage is no longer common (it had been the 
case in the past, especially in 1945, see Sineau 1988), it remains a sort of „royal 
road“ in the National Front. The only two women who truly „count“ in the party owe 
their political recognition to their status as widows of party officials. 
If one considers the evolution through time, one sees a small increase in the number 
of women at the top of the party. In 1986 the political bureau included only one 
woman, Yann Piat, among its 21 members, or 4.8 percent. Ten years later, in 1996, 
two women, Ms. Lehideux and Ms. Stirbois, sat in the 39-member political bureau, 
or 5.1 percent. It should be noted that this slight increase in the number of women 
members came about through an increase in the number of members that make up 
the political bureau, it being easier to give women a place if these are not taken away 
from men. 
4.1.3 In the central committee 
In the central committee there were 21 women out of 120 members, or 17 percent. At 
the time of the Strasbourg Congress in March 1997, only 16 percent of candidates to 
the central committee and 13 percent of those elected were women (13 women out of 
100 members elected). It was precisely to increase the representation of women that 
Le Pen chose eight women out of the 20 members he appoints directly. „His femi-
nism allowed him to name a number of loyal followers, including his daughter Ma-
rine, who was not elected by the Congress.“ (Ras l’Front, supplement to n°62, 1997). 
Marine, a lawyer by training, was also responsible for the National Front’s legal de-
partment and is regional councillor in the Nord-Pas-de-Calais. 
At middle management level the representation of women is as follows: 7 percent 
among regional and department secretaries and 10 percent among local party secre-
taries (section, township or district). 14 It is not much when compared with the Social-
ist Party, the only group for which reliable statistics are available. In that party 23 
percent of department secretaries and 19 percent of section secretaries are women. 
                                                 
13 Yet she has long been active on the extreme right. First an Ordre Nouveau militant in 1972 
alongside her husband, she joined the National Front in 1977, as did her husband. Before his 
death, she ran for several elected offices: the parliamentary elections in 1978, 1981, 1986 and 
1988 and the department elections in 1982. She was elected regional councillor in the Center 
region in March 1986. In 1989, in the municipal elections, she took over for her husband in 
Dreux (Durand 1996: 147) 
14 Henri Rey, Les Cahiers du CEVIPOF, n° 25 
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On the other hand, women are more numerous among delegates to National Front 
congresses. According to available statistics, they represented 14 percent of the dele-
gates in 1978 and 18 percent in 1990, including more than half who were non-
working women (Ysmal 1991: 183). Finally, we know that women occupy 22 per-
cent of positions in the different „circles“ close to the National Front and its presi-
dent (European Women, Modern Enterprise and Liberties, Retirees and Pre-
Retirees). 
Since the split, the FN seems to follow a different line from the MNR, bringing in 
more women on the front stage. After the congress of Paris, in June 2001, the propor-
tion of women in the FN’s national leadership has increased. There are now five 
women out of 47 in the political bureau and 29 out of 120 in the central committee 
(respectively 12,2 and 24,2 percent). On the contrary, the MNR appears less fem-
inised and its leadership resembles a „boys club“15. As a matter of fact, there are only 
2 women out of the 28 members of the political bureau, and 20 women out of the 146 
members of the central committee (respectively 7,1 and 13,7 percent). 
4.2 The National Circle of European Women: a satellite association 
In order to compensate for the weak representation of women in the party and to try 
and increase the National Front’s constituency among women, an organisation or-
ganically linked to the party was created, the National Circle of European Women. 
Founded in 1985 by Ms. Lehideux (with the help of Ariane Biot and Denise Kohler) 
it is one of the satellites that gravitate towards the National Front, each in charge 
with targeting a particular group, in keeping with the so-called „water lily policy“ 
developed by Jean-Marie Le Pen.16 Today the CNFE claims 3,000 members in 
Europe and 1,000 in France, of which 60 percent have a National Front membership 
card. 
The official objective of this „feminine“ circle is to “defend the French family, 
women and fundamental values of our society” (see its program on the  FN’s web-
site, listed in the bibliography). Specifically, it aims at being a platform permitting 
women to express themselves on women’s problems. In an interview with National-
Hebdo on February 22, 1985, Mr. Le Pen confessed, „Though women are full citi-
zens, it is true that there are certain problems that are specific to them, and it is nor-
mal that they be able to express their point of view within a structure that will be part 
of the National Front while maintaining its distinctiveness (Laroche 1997: 154). In 
reality, this association is above-all intended to „make a broad sweep“ and win votes 
                                                 
15  In her detailed examination of the FN’s structures and members, before and after the split, 
Valérie Lafont draws the same conclusion (PhD dissertation forthcoming, see bibliography) 
16 „We create circles as the need arises to make our positions known among all of the nation’s 
social categories and to allow them to express themselves,“ Le Pen explains. „This is the wa-
ter-lily policy.“ Press conference to launch the Var Committee in Defence of the Army, in 
Toulon, March 15, 1996 (In Soudais 1996: 211) 
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(or members) for the National Front among women, up to then reluctant to adopt the 
party's ideals (cf. supra III). In fact, the CNFE attempts to rally to the National 
Front’s cause the „housewives“ that, to quote from a Circle bulletin in 1994, „have 
the misfortune not to correspond to the cultural profile of the new family model.“ 
That is, all those women who do not feel modern and liberated. It is among women 
ignored by the feminist movement that the CNFE is attempting to create „an im-
mense reservoir of voters, militants and candidates on the lists of the National Front 
for local elections (Ras l’Front 1998: 36). Even though taking care of the household 
and having children are the essential functions allotted to women, the CNEF recog-
nises that women's militancy can go as far as becoming politically involved. Such 
involvement is „regarded as the extension of the private commitment in the service 
of the family“ (Laroche 1997:61). 
The CNEF draws its support from department delegations and from sympathisers 
„who are frequently also Catholic activists or members of Laissez-les Vivre (Let 
Them Live) (Laroche 1997:154). These militants, who willingly participate in anti-
abortion campaigns, claim the label „feminists of the right“ or „feminists in favour of 
life“(Venner 1999: 422). In order to disseminate its ideas, the Circle publishes a 
quarterly bulletin, Le Bulletin du CNFE. The Circle also tries to penetrate the net-
work of voluntary associations (charities and school parents’ groups) as well as to 
infiltrate local political life. „In the cities where the National Front has elected mu-
nicipal councillors, whenever they can, CNFE militants take posts in nursery schools, 
grammar schools, and social action groups” (Laroche 1997: 162). Even though it is 
difficult to measure the real influence of the CNFE, certain signs indicate that its 
influence is weak. In the Congress it held from April 7 to 9 in Lyon, three quarters of 
the Congress’ commissions were presided over by men (Camus 1996: 113). 
The CNFE’s program puts this association unquestionably on the extreme right of 
the political spectrum (cf. infra V). Everything shows that the Circle has no doctrinal 
independence vis-a-vis the National Front (Laroche 1997). Its president, Ms. Le-
hideux, far from adhering to the slogan „neither left not right“ claimed for a time by 
Jean-Marie Le Pen, has stated her position, „defining herself as a woman of the right 
with regard to values such as the family, law and order and security,“ as she said in 
an interview given to Libération, February 19, 1996. Could she deny her ideological 
attachments when one knows that she is very much in favour of making abortion 
illegal17 and that she belongs to the Special Committee of the National Union for a 
Christian Europe (UNEC), a Catholic fundamentalist movement that organises pil-
grimages to Auschwitz in order to „stop the genocide of abortion“? (Camus 1996: 
112). 
 
                                                 
17 When she was European deputy, she constantly filed bills aiming to limit or ban legal termi-
nation of pregnancy (Laroche 1997: 157) 
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4.3 What role for women in the National Front ? 
The National Front, loyal to a patriarchal ideology, kept women on the extreme 
fringes of the party for a long time. Accepting them only in small doses, it has also 
limited them to minor functions. While the National Front admits that women have a 
role to play for the good of the party, they must nevertheless respect two unwavering 
principles: the hierarchy between the sexes and the division of labour between them. 
Two principles to which the National Front leaders remain attached even more than 
men from other political parties. 
On the one hand, the primacy of men supposes that women remain particularly sub-
ordinate to the orders of the party and submissive to their leaders, particularly the 
party’s president. The few women who have tried to prove their independence have 
paid for it by being excluded or having to resign. Among those who were excluded 
for insubordination was Yann Piat, who has already been cited, but also Germaine 
Burgaz, a former National Front vice-president (Soudais 1996: 205). 
On the other hand, the division of labour according to sex supposes that women be 
assigned two types of tasks - work among women and social work - to the exclusion 
of the political work that is reserved for men. Work among other women is not only 
reserved for CNFE activists, it is also a task of all women representing the National 
Front. In this manner Ms. Lehideux made use of the platform of the European Par-
liament to diffuse the National Front ideas on the family and the fight against abor-
tion. One of the aspects of the work with other women is also to propagate anti-
feminism, a task that the party reserves for its women members. Ms. Lehideux has 
been predisposed against feminism for a long time. Marie-France Stirbois has taken 
over that role. „Liberate women from feminism“ was the theme of a speech she gave 
during the National Front’s summer university in Toulon in August 1998. She prefers 
„femininity“ to feminism, which she defines „as the quality of what is feminine, that 
is, an intelligence that is never divested of a common sense close to reality“. As to 
the political equality between men and women, Marie-France Stirbois disapproves of 
it as an official in „a party that claims selection and competition“ and considers that 
it „humiliates women“ (Le Monde, 28 August 1998). 
The social work carried out by the party’s female activists is no less important than 
their work among other women. It is carried out, as has been pointed out, by munici-
pal officials. These are helped by the militants of Fraternité Française (French Fra-
ternity), a charitable organisation created by the National Front. This association 
grew significantly thanks to Bruno Mégret (Durand 1996: 206). To deal with the new 
poor and to increase its base of support, the National Front’s former general delegate 
wanted to make this body into a model of „French“ social aid. Directed by a woman 
(Mireille d’Ornano, regional councillor of the Provence-Côte-d’Azur), it functions 
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essentially through female goodwill.18 Who better than women could organise collec-
tions for the nation’s destitute, give social advice, set up food distribution and medi-
cal care, and organise summer camps for children? Relieving poverty, but only that 
of the French, while at the same time bettering the National Front’s image, is the dual 
function reserved for the party’s women militants. 
5. What program for women? 
5.1 Methodology  
Many studies of extreme right-wing ideology are impressionistic, based on quota-
tions taken from different types of data (leaders speeches and writings, party plat-
forms and press) and produced by different organisations (the FN, its circles, other 
extreme right wing movements) at different times. Therefore we decided to limit 
ourselves to the FN as the clearly dominant party at all levels - organisation, ideol-
ogy, electoral support - on the extreme right-wing of French politics. We have sys-
tematically taken the time dimension into account, following the evolution of the 
party's positions since 1973, and we have given priority to one type of data, the elec-
toral programs of the FN, because of its voter-oriented strategy and because of the 
considerable importance the party has attached to their elaboration, as a unifying 
ideological tool inside the party as well as a digest of its essential public positions.  
Five programs are studied here. With the exception of the very first FN program for 
the parliamentary elections of 1973, Défendre les Français19, they belong to the pe-
riod of the electoral take-off of the party. Pour la France (1985), published after the 
first large-scale success of the FN in the 1984 European elections, is presented as a 
synthesis of previous writings of the party and of its president, edited by Jean-Marie 
Le Pen, Bruno Gollnisch (political bureau member, in charge of the party's propa-
ganda) and Jean-Yves Le Gallou (central committee member and New Right). 300 
mesures pour la renaissance de la France (1993) is the most detailed program ever 
published by the party, twice as long (more than 400 pages) as the former, co-
ordinated by Bruno Mégret, delegate-general and in charge of propaganda and com-
munication since 1988. Le contrat pour la France avec les Français (1995) and Le 
grand changement. Et si on essayait le FN ? (1997) are much shorter pieces (some 
sixty pages each), signed by Le Pen, on the occasion of the 1995 presidential election 
and the anticipated 1997 parliamentary elections. Each program is referred to below 
by the letter „P“ followed by the year of its publication.  
We completed this analysis with two types of data. The first type of data we in-
cluded, because of the longstanding rivalry between Le Pen and Mégret, consists 
                                                 
18 „To welcome Vitrolles’ inhabitants (...) Josette Clément, a Fraternité Française activist and 
now deputy in charge of social affairs, does everything she can. She listens, gives advice, un-
dertakes administrative procedures for others“ (Mégret C., 1997: 86) 
19 Unfortunately not available but presented at length in Algazy 1989 
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mainly of books by the two leaders since 1984. For Le Pen : La France est de retour 
(1985), Les Français d’abord (1984) and Le Pen sans bandeau, a book written par 
Jean Marcilly (1984) based on interviews with the FN's leader. And for Mégret: La 
flamme. Les voies de la renaissance (1990) ; L’alternative nationale. Les priorités du 
Front national (1996), La troisième voie. Pour un nouvel ordre économique et social 
(1997). The second is the propaganda of the party specifically addressed to women, 
by the means of its group, Cercle national des femmes d'Europe. For this we used 
several studies already existing on the CNFE (Venner, Lesselier 1997, and particu-
larly Laroche 1997), an interview with its president Martine Lehideux in Présent 
(n°3309, 6 April 1995) and a special issue of its journal, The Bulletin du CNFE. 
5.2 Women in the FN's program 
5.2.1 The „invisible“ women 
A primary feature of all the FN's programs is that women as such are invisible and 
never treated as a specific issue. One will find no entry for „women“ or „equal 
rights“ or „equality“. When they refer to women, it is under the heading „Family“,  
"Welcoming life and family preference" (P1985), "Family, for family preference" 
(P1993), "Family preference “(P1995), "Promoting the family" (P1997). Women are 
only seen as wives and mothers, confined to their roles of child-bearers and house-
wives. And even as such, the space devoted to family matters, compared to issues 
like immigration or security, is very limited. Out of the 426 pages of the 300 meas-
ures., the chapter "Family" is restricted to 14 pages, that is to say 3.3 percent of the 
total space, the smallest of the 18 chapters forming the program with the single ex-
ception of "Overseas" (13 pages)20. 
The second common feature of these programs is the remarkable continuity of their 
stands on women/family issues. From 1973 to 1997, they are based upon the same 
core ideas and values. Their common obsession is the decadence of the French na-
tion, faced with a rapidly declining birth rate on the one hand and a growing popula-
tion of non-European immigrants on the other, seen as gradually outnumbering the 
French and dissolving France’s identity. As early as 1973 the FN waged war against 
„wild immigration“, claiming, „There are actually more than 3 million foreigners in 
France, more than half from North Africa. Out of 800,000 annual births, 200,000 are 
from foreign fathers and mothers. These figures announce the danger“ (Algazy 1989: 
118). While the 1993 program describes immigrants' birth rates as „twice or two and 
a half  times“ higher than the French (P1993 : 53) and imagines „on the other side of 
the Mediterranean, 110 to 130 million Maghrebins“21 waiting to flow in for survival. 
                                                 
20 In the 1985 programme the proportion is 7.5% (15 /200 pages), in the 1995 programme 8% 
(5/63), in the 1997 programme less than 5% (3/62) 
21 The Maghreb consists of the three former colonies of France in North Africa, Tunisia, Alge-
ria and Morocco 
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Against this threat, the major stand of the FN has always been to stop immigration, 
send home illegal immigrants and reserve jobs, social benefits and allowances to 
French nationals - a policy which has gradually come to be referred to, under the 
influence of New Right ideologists, as „national preference“. The topic has been 
abundantly studied (Taguieff 1996) and we will not develop it here except its aspects 
directly related to women. However, a less studied facet of the FN’s program is its 
population and family policy, the two tightly linked together since 1973. The main 
explanation the FN offers for what they see as a „birth collapse“ or „demographic 
winter“, condemning France to demographic and cultural decay, is the crisis of the 
family brought about by the rise of individualism and  the sexual liberation move-
ment of the 60’s, the signs of it being the rising number of couples living together 
without being married, divorces and children born out of wedlock, and the growing 
proportion of women who work and do not want to have children or do not have time 
to bring them up properly. These tendencies are seen as strongly encouraged by the 
French state, criticised for reducing family allowances and benefits, legalising abor-
tion and encouraging family planning. The solutions advocated by the FN, since 
1973, consist of going in the opposite direction, rehabilitating the family which is 
presented as „the basic cell of society“ and launching an active anti-abortion and pro-
life  policy (summed up in Table 13). 
5.2.2 Family policy 
The FN’s family policy advocates giving specific advantages to families and 
especially to families with many children. An idea that appears as early as in the 
1973 program is „family based voting“ or „total universal franchise“, introduced by 
the Vichy government to give more electoral weight to families with children - 
parents should have as many extra votes as they have children below voting age. The 
other main measure advocated as soon as 1973 is a „maternal income“ or minimum 
monthly wage paid to mothers who want to stay at home and take care of their 
children. They see two advantages - for by bringing women back home not only can 
they devote themselves to their children but also, it is explicitly mentioned, they 
liberate jobs for unemployed men (estimated figure - 500,000!). Since the 1993 
program the possibility is also offered to fathers, the maternal income becoming the 
„parental“ income. There are many more measures of the same nature, such as the 
creation of an official statute for stay-at-home mothers, giving them pension rights 
and social security, more flexibility for working mothers (part-time jobs, work 
sharing etc), measures promoting marriage such as tax inducements for married 
couples as opposed to cohabitants, housing facilities for large families such as special 
loans for buying an apartment, giving better family allowances with no income 
limitations etc. The last type of measure seen as early as 1973 has to do with the 
protection of family and youth and the strict control of sexuality (repression of 
pornography, control of sex education in schools, censorship of films and advertising 
etc.). 
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5.2.3 The pro-life policy 
The pro-life policy consists above all of fighting abortion. As early as its first 1973 
program, the FN took a stand against the „legalisation of abortion“. Around that time 
the creation of the MLF (Women’s liberation movement), the publication in the Nou-
vel Observateur (5 April 1971) of a manifesto signed by 343 women who declared 
they had had an abortion and the introduction of several bills in Parliament defending 
the right of women to choose an abortion had put the issue at the centre of the politi-
cal debate. The law legalising abortion, prepared by the Minister of Public Health, 
Simone Veil, was introduced on 17 January 1975 and amended in 1979, payment for 
abortion by Social Security was enacted on 31 December 1982. Until now, the FN 
has been opposed to these measures referred to as „anti-French genocide“ and has 
demanded the repeal of both laws. At the time it led an insulting and violently anti-
Semitic campaign against Simone Veil, nicknamed „The abortionist“ and „Giscard’s 
‘tricoteuse’“, the name given to the French women who sat knitting by the guillotine 
at the time of the Revolution watching the heads fall. But it is also an implicit refer-
ence to the knitting needle, an expedient that was often used to start an abortion. A 
woman, a Jew and a liberal, she was the ideal scapegoat for the FN’s hatred.  
On the other hand the FN programs are in favour of all measures encouraging birth 
and child-rearing, such as making adoption formalities easier, allowing women who 
do not want to keep their child to have it adopted before the birth, fighting against 
sterility etc. 
5.2.4 The „national preference“ 
The common feature of both family and population policies is of course discrimina-
tion between foreigners and French nationals. It is marriage between the French and 
the birth of French babies which is encouraged; family allowances and social bene-
fits are reserved, explicitly or implicitly, for French nationals or Europeans, and the 
reuniting of migrant families is encouraged but … outside France, in their country of 
origin.  
5.2.5 The program's evolution 
There are differences from one program to another and the 1993 program stands par-
ticularly apart. Influenced by Mégret and his team of the New Right (Le Gallou, 
Blot) it refined the arguments and expressed them in a „soft“ and „politically correct“ 
way, intended not to shock the general public. For instance, the 1985 program openly 
presents the Vichy laws and their Family Code as a model for family policies today 
(P1985, p.127). It disputes the existence of specific „rights of the child“ and „rights 
of woman“ as opposed to family rights, and openly attacks the „feminist lobby“ 
which inspired „a whole legislation encouraging the development of a salaried fe-
male workforce and imposing a devalued image of the mother devoted full-time to 
her children, without seeing that if she works in a menial job she does not necessarily 
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find the same satisfaction as if she is a lawyer and that wage-earning and maternity 
are not easily compatible with young children“ (ibidem  p.128). Family is described 
as „a natural and organic“ community, built on a „natural“ division of roles between 
men and women: „In recent years, official ideology, complacently supported by the 
media, has systematically tried to devalue motherhood and abolish all differentiation 
between the  functions of men and women. This utopian attitude leads to the negation 
of the biological and cultural reality which gives women a particular responsibility in 
procreation and the education of children“ (ibid p.134). It openly criticises collectiv-
ist public child-care structures such as day nurseries, nursery schools etc, quoting 
professor François Jacob, for whom the mother’s presence is a must for the child's 
development and  „as attentive and efficient as creche staff may be, nobody can re-
place parents in their relationship with their child“ (ibid. p.128-129). It also explicitly 
deprives foreigners of all social benefits and allowances, these are reserved for 
„French nationals“ (ibid.p.138). 
The 1993 program „revised“ by Mégret and his team is more subtle. It never refers to 
Vichy, it does not openly reject feminism, it introduces the notion of „parental in-
come“ giving each parent the right to stay at home and take care of the children. 
Family policy is presented in general terms, without outlining the fact, except for 
family allowances and housing loans, that it is essentially meant for French nationals, 
because such a position is unconstitutional. However, the basic lines of inspiration 
are the same in all programs, as can be seen in the table summing up measures advo-
cated from 1973 to 1997 (Table 13).  If there are differences, they lie in the number 
and degree of precision in the measures advocated - the 1993 program being by far 
the most developed - in the order in which they appear and essentially in the wording 
and presentation. 
The limited space devoted to the topic of women/family does not mean that it is not 
important, on the contrary. Because the FN's vision of the world, from 1973 to 1997, 
is dominated by the fear of immigration, demographic imbalance, loss of identity and 
decadence, the family as the focus for the reproduction of French children and 
French identity, and particularly women as wives and mothers, plays a strategic part. 
They are an essential instrument of the family and population policy advocated by 
the party. They echo the slogan proposed by Marie-France Stirbois and Michel de 
Rostolan at the 8th Congress of the FN in March 1990: "Let us make French babies 
with French women." That suggests all at once that the place of women is at home, 
that their main function is to reproduce, that they have the duty to preserve the purity 
of the French race and transmit to children, the French of tomorrow, a genuine 
French identity. But as already underlined by many authors (Lesselier, Venner 1997), 
the topic does not need to be developed at length because it goes without saying, it is 
obvious in a vision of the world that sees in the difference in roles ascribed to men 
and women not a social and historical construct but a fact of "nature". 
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A comparison of the MNR’s and FN’s programs for the local elections of March 
2001, both available on their websites (supra section VI.7) show that their positions 
today are basically the same. As before, they only mention women in the section 
devoted to “Family” in the FN’s program and to “Families first” for the MNR (MNR 
2000: 129-135). Their claims have not changed: boost the French demography, dis-
courage abortion, encourage marriage and adoption, bring women back home with 
higher family allowances, maternal (FN) or parental (MNR) incomes, give extra 
votes to large families (FN). The only real difference 
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Table 13. Family and population policies in the National Front Programs (1973-1997) 
FAMILY 1973 1985 1993 1995 1997 
Family     Family „ pillar of 
the nation “ 
should be in-
scribed in the 
Constitution 
 
Family 
vote 
Family based 
voting (extra 
vote per child) 
 „Total univer-
sal franchise“: 
parents should 
vote for their 
children under 
18 
  
Maternal 
income 
Complemen-
tary allocation 
to mothers of 
children under 
2 years old 
willing to give 
up a salaried 
job 
Maternal in-
come 5 000F 
per month as a 
priority to 
mothers of 3 
children 
Maternal or 
parental in-
come equal to 
legal minimum 
wage, 3 years 
for first two 
children,  18 
months for the 
3rd 
Maternal or pa-
rental income of 
6 000 F equal to 
legal minimum 
wage, 3 years for 
1st two chil-
dren,18 months 
for the 3rd 
Maternal or 
parental in-
come equal to 
legal mini-
mum wage 
gives right to 
pension and 
social secu-
rity 
Marriage  Tax  induce-
ments, simpli-
fication of 
legacies and 
matrimonial 
rules favouring 
married cou-
ples  
Laws favouring 
married cou-
ples 
Tax inducement 
for married cou-
ples and deduc-
tion for child 
care allowances 
 
Housing  Special loans 
for family 
housing after 
3rd child, stock 
options for 
large families  
Special family 
loans for buy-
ing house 
Family housing 
loan facilities 
Family hous-
ing loans for 
married cou-
ples,  pay-
ment facili-
ties if many 
children  
Family 
allow-
ance 
  Reassessment 
of family al-
lowances for 
French families 
only 
Reassessment of 
family allow-
ances and child-
rearing allow-
ances 
Reassessment 
of family 
allowances 
Stay-at-
home 
mothers 
 
 
 Give a statute 
to stay-at-home 
mothers, right 
to vote in So-
cial security 
elections 
Give a statute 
to stay-at-home 
mothers : per-
sonal social 
security, pen-
sion, training  
Give a statute to 
stay-at-home 
mothers : per-
sonal social secu-
rity, pension, 
training 
Right for 
stay-at-home 
mothers to 
vote in social 
security elec-
tions 
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Working 
mothers 
 
 
 
 Develop part 
time jobs, work 
sharing and 
flexibility al-
lowing women 
to reconcile 
work and 
motherhood 
Work flexibil-
ity for mothers, 
easy access to 
civil service 
jobs, tax in-
ducements to 
re-employ them  
Give work flexi-
bility to mothers 
and training 
facilities 
Longer maternity 
leave  
 
Educa-
tion 
  Free choice of 
school and 
school cheque 
Free choice of 
school and 
school cheque 
 
Moral 
order 
Against 'sex 
education’ in 
school referred 
to as ‘porno-
philia’  
 Defend youth 
against vio-
lence and por-
nography 
Increased 
measures 
against child 
abuse, control 
on media pro-
grams, more 
rights to family 
associations 
Defend families 
and children: 
Control of me-
dia; press, adver-
tising, more 
rights to family 
associations 
Increased meas-
ures against 
violence against 
children 
 
 
PRO-
LIFE 
     
Abortion Fight against 
'free legal abor-
tion’ 
Repeal the 
1975 Veil law 
and the pay-
ment of abor-
tion costs by 
Social security 
Repeal the 
1975 Veil law 
and the pay-
ment of abor-
tion costs by 
Social security 
Protect the life of 
the unborn „in-
nocent“ child  
Discourage 
abortion 
Contra-
ception 
 No public 
funds for fam-
ily planning 
   
Informa-
tion 
 Combat steril-
ity and inform 
about sexually-
transmitted 
diseases 
   
Adoption   Facilitate pre 
and post birth 
adoption and 
procedures of 
adoption for 
abandoned 
French children
Facilitate pre and 
post birth adop-
tion and proce-
dures of adoption 
for French chil-
dren 
Facilitate pre 
and post birth 
adoption 
Social 
benefits 
 Birth allow-
ances - No 
income limits 
 Pre-birth alloca-
tions 
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in line with the reactions of the MNR’s leaders at the time the law was discussed 
(supra, section III.)“ is that, contrary to the FN, its program takes stand explic-
itly against “parity policies” in general. In a paragraph called “No to parity, yes 
to free choice”(MNR 2000:135), they refuse any law “imposing quotas”, consid-
ering that if men and women are equal, they are “different and complemen-
tary”, and that one should not “force nature” to oblige women to hold the same 
occupations. If the program insists, more than the FN’s, on their right to work, 
the need of day care centres, part time jobs and training facilities, above all it 
enhances and glorifies the role of women as “mothers” and housewives.  
5.3 Women in the writings of Le Pen and Mégret  
The writings of the two FN leaders give as little space to women as the programs. In 
Le Pen’s French first there are some 7 pages out of 245, mostly under the headings 
„Man and woman“ and „Feminism and feminity“. In Le Pen without mask there is an 
11 page chapter called „Man is born from woman“ (out of 241). In France is back 
there are 6 pages out of 301 about „Families and the social sector“. While in 
Mégret’s The flame there is a small passage on „Cheers for women!“ (2 pages out of 
313) encouraging them to bear children and take care of their home and children, 
„the noblest task“(p. 278). In The Third way one finds 4.5 pages out of 383 mostly 
under the headings „Baby krach“, „The disintegrated family“, „Parental income“ and 
„Family preference“. And in The National Alternative there is a 12 page chapter (out 
of 259) on „Pro-life preference“.  
The general argumentation is the same in their writings as in the party’s programs, 
not surprisingly as first Le Pen then Mégret and his team have forged these pro-
grams, but the ideological basis is detailed more openly, and at greater length. Both 
Mégret’s and le Pen’s ideas find their inspiration in the French nationalist tradition, 
in the line of thinkers such as Maurice Barrès and Charles Maurras, that developed 
against the Enlightenment philosophy and the heritage of the French Revolution, 
updated with references to socio-biology and anthropology and authors such as Kon-
rad Lorenz, Georges Dumézil, etc. For both, the individual does not exist outside of 
the „natural“ and organic communities in which he is rooted, the nation, the land, and 
the family. The family is the „vital elementary cell“ which enables the biological and 
cultural reproduction of the French nation. In this regard, women have no rights as 
such. They are reproducers. And their „liberation“ is seen as disrupting the natural 
order and a threat to the very existence of the nation. As Le Pen puts it in For France 
1985, the double action of the socialist government and of „the so-called feminist 
lobby“ is bringing about „the dissolution of family and more generally of all natural 
and organic community (…)." In recent years, the focus was never on the family but 
on „the woman“ and „child“ (p.128). Mégret says exactly the same thing, „The so-
cialist defence of the rights of men plays the individual against the communities to 
which he belongs. There again, the right balance between men and the groups they 
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belong to is broken (…). The right of women, socialist style, is set against the rights 
of families. It is the same with the alleged „rights of the child“ that the ready-made 
ideological trend presently tries to establish as a new counterweight to the family.“ 
(The Flame p. 32) 
5.3.1 The „Catholic“ approach of Le Pen  
However, there are clear differences between the two men’s positions, more obvious 
than in the programs. Le Pen’s approach is more traditional and essentially grounded 
in religion. He defines himself as a Catholic (France is back p. 157), he is „proud to 
be a Christian“ as well as „proud to be French“ because he considers Catholicism as 
„the best religion, the one that upholds, in my opinion, the revealed truth“ (ibid. 
p.158). This is mere opportunism, for he is no true believer. He never was a church-
goer, did not marry religiously, divorced his first wife and when he was a student and 
was prosecuted for disorderly behaviour, completely drunk, in a church in Aix-les-
Bains (Le Canard Enchaîné 1992: 76). But in the mid 80’s he sensed his Catholic 
pose could attract traditionalist right-wing voters and started making frequent refer-
ences to Christianity, requested an audience with the Pope etc. In particular he sys-
tematically presents the Virgin Mary and Joan of Arc as the ideals of womanhood” 
(Laroche 1997). He considers that the cult of Mary, the symbol of grace and mother-
hood, has done a lot to generate respect for women. He likes to evoke the influence it 
had on the Code of Chivalry, presented as a model for harmonious relations between 
men and women, as opposed to the „class struggle“ between the sexes, which he sees 
as „confrontational “ and „revolutionary“ and which he accuses feminists of promot-
ing. To their claims he opposes the example of Joan of Arc, a young shepherdess 
who fought in the name of God and delivered France from the English occupation: 
„We must not forget that we had, four hundred years before the feminist claims of 
Mrs Gisèle Halimi (NDLR :the founder of the pro-choice movement Choisir), a sev-
enteen year-old victorious general who was a young girl, a simple little peasant from 
Lorraine.“ (French first p.196 and Le Pen without mask p.174) However, a common 
feature of these two women is their virginity, an implicit negation of the sexuality of 
women.  
Another example of this traditional and subordinate view of women is given by Le 
Pen’s stands about women going to work as in Le Pen without mask (In Marcilhy 
1984) where he questions the need for it: „I often ask myself: ‘Is it necessary for a 
woman to learn a profession? Is it responsible to turn her away? Liberate woman! 
When you set the bee free, you get the bumble-bee!“ (p.171). For him woman is 
above all the „the child bearer and the heart companion of man“, only after this, the 
human being suited to be integrated in the workforce of big modern industries“ (ibid. 
p.167). „One has artificially turned women away from their natural function by offer-
ing them an illusory integration into the working world presented by pernicious ide-
ologists as a token of dignity and liberation... Deflected from their intrinsic social 
role, millions of women have found themselves pushed into a less and less open sec-
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tor, contributing to the development of unemployment and - but is it really by 
chance? - serving against their will to create a new proletariat, easily to exploit - and 
manipulate - by political organisations whose aim is to destroy national harmony by 
constantly arousing totally artificial confrontations” (ibid. p.169-170). In the same 
way, he is firmly against public child care structures, which he denigrates as symbols 
of collectivism and "a sign of the rampant turn to socialism of our country“ (France 
is back p. 212), incapable of giving children the love and affection of a mother (For 
France p. 129) and seen as responsible for the split of the family cell, unemployment 
and opening the way to all social deviations (drugs, delinquency etc.). 
5.3.2 The „sexual politics“ of Le Pen 
There is, however, a paradox, for this admirer of the Virgin Mary constantly refers to 
sex in a provocative and often licentious manner, in a way no other politician would 
allow himself to speak in public. His deliberate use of sexual metaphors, as shown by 
Pierre Jouve and Ali Magoudi and Maryse Lallemand, serves two purposes. It helps 
mobilisation against immigrants - male immigrants, for female immigrants are never 
referred to (Lesselier 1997: 61) - presented as a sexual threat to the French nation. 
Statements such as, „Tomorrow immigrants will settle in your home, eat your soup 
and sleep with your wife, your daughter or your son.“ „The Islamic world is beating 
at the borders of Europe and slowly penetrating it,“ or  France is, „a brothel for six 
million immigrants,"(quoted from Lallemand 1997: 77) arouse aggressivity amongst 
his male audience and frighten the female audience, making both more receptive to 
the FN’s xenophobic and authoritarian positions.  
On the other hand, the combination of these evocations with the celebration of Chris-
tian purity and virginity also serves a purpose. It helps keep under control the sexual 
impulses his speeches liberate. „Licentiousness is thus counterbalanced by antitheti-
cal evocations, desexualised feminine symbols which contradict the initial provoca-
tion of Jean- Marie Le Pen. He is a pyromaniac fireman. He excites the other sexu-
ally and presents himself as the exclusive protector of prudish values. Sexual refer-
ences in his speeches are only there to exorcise sexuality in real life, to label it as 
dangerous.“(Jouve, Magoudi 1988: 73). The moral order is safe.  
5.3.3 The „New Right“ approach of Mégret 
Mégret’s writings, in contrast are neither religious nor licentious. He makes no refer-
ence to his Catholic affiliation. If he talks about religion, it is as the cultural and his-
torical matrix of France, corresponding to a inner „need of man for sacredness“ (Na-
tional alternative p. 42-44). He makes no mystic references to the Virgin Mary or 
Joan of Arc. And his presentation of relations between the sexes is less traditionalist 
than Le Pen’s. He and his friends come from the Club de l’Horloge, a think-tank of 
the French New Right, which dressed the same old ideas in modern clothes. They 
launched the concept of „national preference“ to legitimise their anti-immigrant 
stands, they reformulated racist theories, founded on supposed genetic inequalities 
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between races, into a more covert racism based on cultural differences and incom-
patibilities: races are not unequal, they are equally respectable, but they are different 
and should not mix etc.(Taguieff 1987). The same goes for gender relations. The 
New Right tries to appeal to women by celebrating their difference, waging war 
against the „universalism“ of feminism, a position that certain feminists can agree 
with (Lesselier 1999). Megret’s argumentation is very similar to the one expressed in 
the New Right review, Elements (n°94, February 1999). Along this line, he is careful 
not to downgrade female work, he just considers it as equivalent to the work of stay-
at-home mothers. - And he does not reserve it for women, he is the one who thought 
of turning the „maternal income“ into „parental income“ open to both parents who 
stay home to take care of the children: „Every time the FN brings forward this pro-
posal - the parental income - it is accused of wanting to send women back home to 
the kitchen sink. Well, this is obviously not our goal which is, on the contrary, to 
offer mothers a new freedom. There is no question of stopping nor even dissuading 
those who want to work from doing so (…). But on the other hand if work can be a 
noble activity, the education of children is another one that can be equally enriching. 
Besides, who could argue that an assembly line job or a painstaking task in front of a 
computer screen, as useful as they may be, enrich the life of a woman more than her 
role as a mother? Let’s add, for the attention of our detractors, that if this measure is 
primarily meant for women, it is not exclusively aimed at them because the parental 
income will also be available to fathers.“ (New alternative, p. 108). 
5.4 CNFE positions (National Circle of European Women) 
5.4.1 A traditionalist view of women and society 
The women’s circle of the FN is tightly linked to Catholic fundamentalist and pro-
life circles and militates in favour of a traditionalist and moralistic vision of woman 
and family, closer to Le Pen’s than Megret’s line. Created in 1985, it presents itself 
as a circle of reflection and influence „so that women become aware of the family, 
social, educational, cultural and political problems they are faced with every day and 
to remind them that the revival of France and Europe will not take place without 
them.“ (quoted by Laroche 1997: 153). Its president, Martine Lehideux, is a practis-
ing Catholic, member of the pro-life movement "Let them Live", fighting against 
free abortion, and of the UNEC (Union of Christian European Nations). She 
launched the circle as „a reaction to May 68“ and to feminist values, which she found 
„destructive of our family values“ and representing „a certain ugliness, all at once 
moral and physical“22. On the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the circle's founda-
tion, a special issue of the CNFE Bulletin (No. 32, March-June 1990) devoted to the 
circle’s Congress of Nantes (9-11 March 1990) confirms its links with leading fun-
damentalist networks: it advertises for the pilgrimages organised by Christianity-
                                                 
22 Interview of Martine Lehideux, Présent, 6 April 1995 
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Solidarity and Catholic Renewal and for the French Friendship and Christianity 
Symposium, for Radio-Courtoisie, a fundamentalist radio station and for AGRIF 
(General alliance against racism and for the respect of French and Christian Identity). 
The defence of a moral order is its main centre of interest, as shown by its selection 
of news („Echoes“), relative to abortion, the abortion pill, films and TV programs 
judged indecent, marriage between homosexuals etc. A summary of the Congress’s 
work faithfully reflects the content of the FN programs, putting forward „family 
preference“ through measures such as maternal income, family-based voting, work 
flexibility, repeal of the Veil law, housing facilities and tax inducements for families 
etc. It just puts more emphasis on the education of children (school cheque and free 
choice of school, control of school books, civic education) and the „protection of 
youth“ against the four main dangers in their eyes: Marxism, drugs, pornography and 
AIDS.  
5.4.2 The dilemma of the  CNFE 
However, detailed analysis of the proceedings of the Congress’s commissions, on 
education, teaching and training, health, women’s work and the media, reveals the 
contradictions of the Circle obviously torn between its traditional stands and the ne-
cessity to take into account the changing aspirations of today’s women. This is espe-
cially evident in the commission about work (also Laroche 1997, Venner 1997). 
They admit, reluctantly, it is legitimate for women to work. So does their president, 
Martine Lehideux, in her interview for Présent: „I am nevertheless a modern woman 
and I know that today most young women and young girls who have been to school 
can work (...). When one has studied, when one has degrees, one wants to show the 
country, to show men, that we are capable of doing a job, of doing it well.“  She and 
the CNFE support the claim for the respect of the principle, „Equal pay for equal 
work“ (Ibidem and Bulletin du CNFE: 14). And although first opposed to the idea of 
collective structures for child care, the CNFE now asks for more creches and nurser-
ies (Laroche 1997: 159). They encourage women to step outside the home and par-
ticipate in associations and political life, to be present in parents' associations and 
charity organisations, to run in elections, to play their part in society not only at 
home. In her interview in the journal Présent Martine Lehideux says exactly the 
same, quoting the Greek Pericles: „A woman who does not take part in politics de-
serves to be seen not as a peaceful citizen but as a useless citizen.“  
Nevertheless, in spite of these few concessions to modernity, it is obvious that in the 
CNFE’s eyes family should come first, and it is definitely more in favour of part-
time jobs and work flexibility. The conclusion of the „Work of women“ commission 
in the 1990 CNFE Congress makes a very clear distinction between: „a) The perma-
nent state of life suggested by the expression „mother of a family“ which corre-
sponds or should correspond to a natural and human vocation of woman complemen-
tary to man’s, the base of all life in society,“ and „b) Having a job, which is a „con-
tingent function“ and anyway temporary in human life. It is not an absolute, but a 
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help to the family cell, unless it happens to be a real vocation demanding the total 
involvement of the person“. The „ modernisation “ of the CNFE has its limits.  
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6. Conclusion 
If the National Front is, as Le Pen puts it, „unloved“ by the French extreme right, is it 
not, above all, because women are „unloved“ by his party? Today, women, as voters, 
are gradually asserting their autonomy. How can they give any credibility to a party 
which deliberately ignores them as citizens and as individuals, considering them only 
as part of communities such as  the couple, the family or the nation, which they are 
supposed to obey by getting married, having children and bringing them up? Wives 
and mothers, French women also are working women, faced with specific problems 
in a context of economic restructuring: unemployment, insecurity, underpayment, 
lack of child care structures etc. So far the FN has never paid any attention to all 
these problems.  
At a time when all parties are making an effort to promote parity between men and 
women, and trying to mobilise female voters, the leaders of the two rival extreme 
right-wing parties realise, a little late, that they have made a strategic error. Before 
the 1999 European elections for instance, both, in haste, held a women’s convention, 
which they had never done before. Le Pen, in his provocative way, denounced the 
„women’s invasion“ of the workplace and celebrated  the „almost godly role“ they 
have in „transmitting life“, regretting the present „confusion of roles“ 23. Whereas 
Mégret’s speech was as usual more „politically correct“ it was, on the whole, as ba-
sically anti-feminist as Le Pen’s (Libération 19 April 1999). Wishing that women 
should „keep their place“ as mothers and home-makers instead of acting as if they 
were men, denouncing the very idea of women’s quotas, he had nothing more to pro-
pose than the development of part-times jobs and the creation of a parental income. It 
was therefore most unlikely they would convince women, considering how they had 
addressed them until then. The scores of Mégret and Le Pen on June 13 confirm, not 
surprisingly, that neither the FN nor the MNR have succeeded in winning support 
among French women (Tables 1 and 2). And parallel to the explicit anti-parity line 
followed by the MNR asserted since its programme of Poitiers (supra section V), and 
implemented in its selection of candidates for the 2001 local elections (mostly male, 
see supra section III), it seems to indeed attract less women than the FN. A pool of 
surveys conducted in 2000-2001 among supporters of both parties shows that the 
proportion of women is much higher among FN’sympathisers (48 percent) than 
among MNR’s sympathisers (37 percent)24.  
                                                 
23 FN’s convention on 29 May, Le Monde, 1 June 1999 
24  Study realised by Jérôme Fourquet, pooling 26 surveys conducted by CSA for Le Figaro on 
national samples representative of the French population in age to vote, and isolating a sub-
sample of 605 people saying they feel close to the FN or to the MNR. Data available on the 
website of Le Figaro at the time of the local elections, March 2001.  
86 France: The Front National 
7. Bibliography 
7.1 The Front National and the French extreme right 
Algazy, Joseph: L’extrême droite en France de 1965 à 1984. Paris: L’Harmattan, 
1989 
Birenbaum, Guy: Le Front national en politique. Paris: Ballan, 1992 
Camus, Jean-Yves (dir.): Le Front national. Histoire et analyses. Paris: Olivier 
Laurens, 1996 
Camus, Jean-Yves / Monzat, René: Les droites radicales et nationales en France. 
Lyon: Presses Universitaires de Lyon, 1992 
Camus, Jean-Yves: La structure du „camp national“ en France. La périphérie 
militante et organisationnelle du Front national et du Mouvement national 
républicain. In: Perrineau, Pascal (Ed.): Les croisés de la société fermée. L’Europe 
des extrêmes droites. La Tour d’Aigues: L’Aube, 2001, pp.199-226 
Le Canard Enchaîné: Le Pen, le vrai. Les dossiers du Canard enchaîné (1992)45 
Castells, Raymond: Hitler, Le Pen, Mégret, leur programme. Paris: Castells, 1998 
Darmon, Michael/ Rosso, Romain: Front contre Front. Paris: Seuil, 1999 
Delwit, Pascal / De Waele, Jean-Michel / Rea, Andrea (eds): L’extrême droite en 
France et en Belgique. Paris: Editions Complexe, 1998 
Durand, Géraud: Enquête au cœur du Front national. Paris: Jacques Grancher, 1996 
Gaspard, Françoise: Une petite ville en France. Paris: Gallimard,1990 
Golias: Le retour des croisés. Le guide de l’extrémisme catholique(1991)27-281 
Ignazi, Piero: The silent counter-revolution. Hypotheses on the emergence of ex-
treme right wing parties in Europe. In: European Journal of Political Research 
(1992)22, pp. 3-34 
Ivaldi, Gilles: La scission du Front national. In: Regards sur l’actualité(1999)251, 
pp.17-32 
Jouve, Pierre / Magoudi, Ali: Les dits et les non-dits de Jean-Marie Le Pen. Paris: La 
Découverte, 1988 
Konopnicki, Guy: Les filières noires. Paris: Denoël,1996 
Krieg, Alice: Vacance argumentative : l’usage de sic dans la presse d’extrême droite 
contemporaine. In: Mots(1999)58, pp. 11-34 
Lafont, Valérie: Les jeunes militants du Front national. Trois modèles d’engagement 
et de cheminement. In: Revue Française de Science Politique(2001)1-2, pp. 175-198 
France: The Front National 87 
Laurent, Annie/Perrineau, Pascal: L’extrême droite éclatée. In: Revue française de 
science politique(1999)49, pp.633-641  
Le Monde: L’extrême droite en France. Dossiers et documents du Monde(1984) 
Marcilly, Jean: Le Pen sans bandeau. Paris: Grancher, 1984 
Mayer, Nonna: The French National Front. In: Betz, Hanz-Georg / Immerfall, Stefan: 
The New Politics of the Right. New York: Saint Martin ‘s Press, 1998, pp. 11-25 
Mayer, Nonna / Perrineau, Pascal (eds): Le Front national à découvert. Paris: Presses 
de Sciences Po, 1996 (1st edition 1989) 
Mouriaux, René/Osmond, Eric/Picquet, Christian: La scission du Front national. 
Processus, résultats, perspectives. In: Mauvais temps(1999)4, pp.9-36 
Orfali, Birgitta: L’adhésion au Front national. Paris: Kimé, 1990 
Perrineau, Pascal (Ed.): Les croisés de la société fermée. L’Europe des extrêmes 
droites. La Tour d’Aigues: L’Aube, 2001 
Perrineau, Pascal: Le symptôme Le Pen. Radiographie des électeurs du Front 
national, Paris: Fayard, 1997 
Petitfils, Jean-Christian: L’extrême droite en France. Paris: PUF, 1983 
Pouvoirs: L’extrême droite en Europe(1998)87, Seuil  
Revue Politique et Parlementaire, Special issue, Extrême droite: la radicalisation. 
(1998)995 
Souchard, Maryse: Le Pen, les mots: analyse d’un discours d’extrême droite. Paris: 
Le Monde-Editions, 1997 
Soudais, Michel: Le Front national en face. Paris: Flammarion, 1996 
Sternhell, Zeev: La droite révolutionnaire (1885-1914). Les origines françaises du 
fascisme. Paris: Seuil, 1978  
Taguieff, Pierre-André / Tribalat, Michèle: Face au Front national. Arguments pour 
une contre-offensive. Paris: La Découverte, 1998 
Taguieff, Pierre-André: Sur la Nouvelle droite. Jalons d’une analyse critique. Paris: 
Descartes, 1994 
Taguieff, Pierre-André: La rhétorique du national-populisme. In: Mots(1988)9, pp. 
113-138 
Telos: Special double issue on the French New Right. (1994)98-99 
Winock, Michel: Histoire de l’extrême droite en France. Paris: Seuil, 1993 
88 France: The Front National 
7.2 FN voters 
Betz, Hans-Georg: Radical right-wing populism in Western Europe. New York: 
Saint Martin’s Press, 1994 
Gaspard, Françoise: L’évolution du FN à Dreux et dans ses environs. In: Revue 
Politique et Parlementaire(1990)945, pp. 62-69 
Jaffré, Jérôme: L’électorat féminin, terre de mission pour le Front national. In: Le 
Monde(1998) 31 October 
Levy, Deborah R.: Women of the French National Front. In: Parliamentary Af-
fairs(1989)1, pp. 102-111 
Mayer, Nonna: Sociologie d’une extrême droite éclatée. In: Sofres: L’Etat de 
l’opinion. Paris: Seuil, 2000, pp. 93-102  
Mayer, Nonna: Ces Français qui votent Front national. Paris: Flammarion, 1999  
Mayer, Nonna: The Front National Vote in the Plural. Patterns of Prejudice(1998)1, 
pp. 4-24 
Mayer, Nonna: Du vote lepéniste au vote frontiste. In: Revue Française de Science 
Politique(1997)3-4, pp. 438 - 453 
Mayer, Nonna: The National Front Vote and Right-Wing Extremism, 1988-1995. 
Research on Democracy and Society(1996)32, 1, pp. 197-222 
Mossuz-Lavau, Janine / Sineau, Mariette: La mutation de l’électorat féminin. Les 
femmes privilégient la gauche et résistent au vote exutoire d’extrême droite. In: Le 
Monde, Dossiers et Documents(1988), pp. 46-47 
Sineau, Mariette: L’électrice paradoxale. In: Bréchon, Pierre / Laurent, Annie / 
Perrineau, Pascal (Eds): Les cultures politiques des Français. Paris: Presses de 
Sciences Po, 2000, pp.111-136 
7.3 Extreme Right and women 
Après-Demain: Special issue on Les intégrismes et les femmes. :(1991)330  
Brunnquell, Frédéric: Les associations familiales. Combien de divisions? Paris: 
Dagorno, 1994 
Cadac (Collectif National pour les Droits des Femmes): Les femmes et l’extrême  
Droite, Paris: 1998 
Cahiers du Féminisme: L’extrême droite et les femmes. (1990)4, 54 pp. 5-24 
Chombeau, Christiane: Les femmes du FN dénoncent le féminisme, l‘idéologie de 
débauche’. In: Le Monde(1998), 28 August  
France: The Front National 89 
Chronique Féministe(1993)47-48, Les femmes et l’extrême droite, Bruxelles, 
Université des femmes 
Fabre, Clarisse (Ed.): Les femmes et la politique. Du droit de vote à la parité. Paris: 
Le Monde/EJL (Librio), 2001 
Guillaumin, Colette: Sexism, a Right-wing Constant of Any Discourse, a Theoretical 
Note. In: Seidel, Gill: The Nature of the Right. A Feminist Analysis of Order Pat-
terns. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1988 
Lallemand, Myriam: La métaphore sexuelle dans le discours de Jean-Marie Le Pen, 
in: Lesselier, Claudie / Venner, Fiammetta (eds): L’extrême droite et les femmes. 
Villeurbanne: Editions Golias, 1997, pp. 71-104 
Les Maries-Jeannes: L’extrême droite contre les femmes. Un recueil de textes et de 
Documents. Paris: 1994 (1ste edition 1992) 
Lesselier, Claudie: Nouvelle droite: un antiféminisme différentialiste. In: Mauvais 
Temps(1999)4 
Lesselier, Claudie / Venner, Fiammetta (eds): L’extrême droite et les 
femmes.Villeurbanne: Editions Golias, 1997 
Mouvement français pour le planning familial(1995) L’avortement: un droit à 
protéger. Oppositions et opposants en France 
Nouvelles Questions Feministes: Special Issue on Les nationalismes et 
l’antiféminisme. (1992)13, 3 
Paul-Lévy, Françoise: Le Pen: attention danger! In: Les Temps modernes(1986) 
(475), pp. 147-152  
Ras Le Front (Commission contre la préférence nationale): Radiographie du FN 
(préférence nationale, sexisme, ordre moral, préférence nationale, commandos anti-
IVG). Paris, 1998 
Ras L’ Front : Contre le fascisme, le sexisme. Supplement to Ras l’Front, (1999) 62 
Réflexes: Special issue, Face au sexisme, au machisme, au patriarcat… On a toujours 
raison de se révolter. (1995), 
Seidel, Gill: The Nature of the Right. A Feminist Analysis of Order Patterns. Am-
sterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1988 
Venner, Fiammetta: L’extrême droite et l’antiféminisme. In Bard, Christine (ed.): Un 
siècle d’antiféminisme. Paris: Fayard, 1999, pp. 417-430 
Venner, Fiammetta: L’opposition à l’avortement: du lobby au commando. Paris: 
Berg, 1995 
90 France: The Front National 
7.4 Women among FN activists and elected representatives  
Gaspard, Françoise: Résultats des élections législatives : les femmes symboles du 
renouveau politique ? In: Parité-Infos(1997)8, pp. 4-5 
Gaspard, Françoise: Elections législatives mars 1993. Etude parité. Résultats. Paris: 
Conseil National des Femmes Françaises  
Lafont, Valérie: Carrières de l’extrême. Militants du Front national. PhD thesis Paris: 
Institut d’étude politiques (forthcoming) 
Laroche, Françoise: Maréchale nous voilà! Le Cercle national des femmes d’Europe. 
In: Lesselier, Claudie / Venner, Fiammetta (eds): L’extrême droite et les femmes. 
Villeurbanne: Golias, 1997, pp.153-164 
National Hebdo: Radiographie de National Hebdo(1990)297, 22 March 
Orfali, Birgitta: Parfum d’extrême droite: les adhérentes du Front national. In: 
Lesselier, Claudie/ Venner, Fiammetta (eds): L’extrême droite et les femmes. 
Villeurbanne: Golias, 1997, pp. 169-191 
Servan-Schreiber, Claude: La fausse-vraie maire de Vitrolles: une insulte pour toutes 
les femmes. In: Parité-Infos(1997), p. 5 
Sineau, Mariette: Profession: femme politique. Sexe et pouvoir sous la Cinquième 
République. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2001 
Sineau, Mariette: Des femmes en politique. Paris: Economica, 1988 
 Venner, Fiammetta: Une autre manière d’être féministe? Le militantisme féminin 
d’extrême droite. In: Lesselier, Claudie / Venner, Fiammetta (eds): L’extrême droite 
et les femmes. Villeurbanne: Golias, 1997, pp. 133-151 
Ysmal, Colette: Sociologie des élites du FN (1976-1986). In Mayer, Nonna 
/Perrineau, Pascal (eds): Le Front national à découvert. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 
1996, pp. 107-118 
Ysmal, Colette: Les cadres du Front national: les habits neufs de l’extrême droite. In: 
Duhamel, Olivier / Jaffré Jérôme (eds): Sofres: L’état de l’opinion. Paris: Seuil, 
1991, pp. 181-197 
7.5 Opinion surveys 
Buisson, Patrick: La droite dans tous ses états. In: Sofres. L’état de l’opinion 1999. 
Paris: Seuil, 1999, pp. 11-48 
Csa / Libération: Voting intentions for Le Pen and Mégret in the 1999 European 
Elections. In: Libération(1998), 28 December 
Le Gall, Gérard: Le Front national à l’épreuve du temps, in: Sofres. L’état de 
l’opinion 1998. Paris: Seuil, 1998, pp. 44-85 
France: The Front National 91 
Mayer, Nonna / Perrineau, Pascal: La puissance et le rejet ou le lepénisme dans 
l’opinion. In: Sofres. L’état de l’opinion 1993. Paris: Seuil, 1993, pp. 63-78 
Sofres: L’opinion des sympathisants du Front national sur le conflit entre Jean-Marie 
Le Pen et Bruno Mégret. In: Le Nouvel Observateur(1998), 19-23 December  
7.6 Writings by FN leaders and members 
Bompard, Marie-Claude and Jacques: Voyage autour de la femme. Marseille: 
Barthélémy, 1991 
Lehideux, Martine: La politique familiale. Groupe des droites européennes, 
supplement to Europe et Patries, 7, 1985 
Le Pen, Jean-Marie: Lettres françaises ouvertes à M.-F. Garaud, Ph. de Villiers, Ch. 
Pasqua, Ch. de Gaulle, M. Gallo, J.-P. Chevènement, A. Delon, L. Jospin. Paris: Ed. 
Objectif France, 1999 
Le Pen, Jean-Marie: L’espoir. Paris: Albatros, 1989 
Le Pen, Jean-Marie: Pour la France. Paris: Albatros, 1985 
Le Pen, Jean-Marie: La France est de retour. Paris: Editions Carrère, 1985 
Le Pen, Jean-Marie: Les Français d’abord. Paris: Editions Carrère ,1984 
Mégret, Bruno: Le chagrin et l’espérance. Du FN au MNR. Paris, Editions Cité 
Liberté, 2001 
Mégret, Bruno: La nouvelle Europe: pour la France et l’Europe des nations. Paris: 
Editions nationales, 1998 
Mégret, Bruno: La troisième voie. Pour un nouvel ordre économique et social. Paris: 
Editions nationales, 1997 
Mégret, Bruno: L’alternative nationale. Les priorités du FN. Paris: Editions 
nationales, 1996 
Mégret, Bruno: Immigration. Les solutions du Front national. In: Ecrits de Paris 
(1991)528, pp.23-25 
Mégret, Bruno: La Flamme: les voies de la renaissance. Paris: Laffont, 1990 
Mégret, Catherine: V comme Vitrolles: l’histoire d’une victoire. Paris: Editions 
nationales, 1997 
Piat, Yann: Seule, tout en haut à droite. Paris: Fixot, 1991 
7.7 The FN et MNR programmes  
Front National /Le Pen: Le grand changement. Et si on essayait le FN? Sn/sl 1997 
92 France: The Front National 
Front National / Le Pen: Le contrat pour la France avec les Français. Saint Brieuc: 
Presses Bretonnes,1995 
Front National: L’alternative nationale. 300 mesures pour la renaissance de la 
France. Programme de gouvernement, Paris: Editions nationales, 1993  
Front National: Passeport pour la victoire. 1988 
Front National: Pour la France, Programme du Front national. Paris: Albatros, 1985 
Mouvement National Républicain: Pour que vive la France. Programme du MNR. 
Paris: Editions Cité Liberté, 2000 
7.8 The FN and MNR websites  
http://www.m-n-r.com/  
http://www.front-national.com/ 
France: The Front National 93 
8. Annexes 
Annexe 1: The French Electoral System 
Elections Constituency Elected 
Representatives 
Electoral system Period Last 
election 
SUPRA 
NATIONAL: 
     
European France MEP's (Members 
of the European 
Parliament) 
Lists, proportional 
representation 
5 years 1999 
NATIONAL:      
Presidential France President Single member, ma-
jority rule, 2 rounds 
5 years*
 
1995 
Parliamentary Parliamentary 
constituencies
National Assem-
bly deputies 
Single member, ma-
jority rule, 2 rounds 
5 years 1997 
LOCAL:      
Regional** Departments 
in each region
Regional coun-
cillors 
Lists, two rounds, mix 
of proportional repre-
sentation and majority 
rule 
6 years 1998 
Departmental Cantons of 
each depart-
ment 
General council-
lors 
Single member, ma-
jority rule, 2 rounds 
6 years 
(1/2 
renewed 
every 3 
years) 
2001 
Municipal Municipality Municipal coun-
cillors 
Lists, majority rule, 2 
rounds in small towns 
(popul. under 3, 500)/ 
3, 500 and above: mix 
of proportional repre-
sentation and majority 
rule 
6 years 2001 
*The length has been reduced to 5 years by the referendum of 20 September 2000 ** The electoral 
rule for regional elections was changed by the law of 19 January 1999 
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Annexe 2. The Gender Parity Law of 6 June 2000 
 
Elections concerned 
Municipal elections in large towns (3, 500 inhabitants and over) 
Regional elections and elections to the Assembly of Corsica 
Senatorial elections (in large departments - 70 percent of the seats - which elect at 
least 3 senators) 
Elections to the National Assembly 
European Elections 
 
Not concerned 
Municipal elections in small towns (less than 3, 500 inhabitants) 
Departmental elections 
Senatorial elections in small departments (1 or 2 senators) 
 
Requirements 
- Elections with proportional representation: political parties must present as many 
women as men candidates, if not their list will not be registered. If there is just one 
round (senatorial, European elections), each list, from top to bottom, must alternate 
one man/one woman or vice versa. If there are two rounds (regional elections, 
including to the Assembly of Corsica, and municipal elections which mix 
proprotional representation and majority rule) gender parity must be respected for 
each block of six candidates.  
- Elections to the National Assembly (single member, majority rule, two rounds, see 
Annexe 1) : parties are not obliged to present as many women as men but will be 
fined if they don‘t. 
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Annexe 3: Parliamentary elections in Metropolitan France (1988-1997) 
 
5 June 1988 (1st round) Number of votes % of valid votes 
Extreme Left 88 204 0,4 
Communists 2 680 194 11,2 
Socialists 8 381 827 34,9 
Left Radical 279 230 1,2 
Presidential Majority 351 257 1, 5 
Ecologists 86 257 0,3 
Regionalists 17 765 0,1 
Rally for the Republic 4 614 137 19,2 
Union for French Democracy 4 502 712 18,8 
Other Right Parties 608 695 2,5 
National Front 2 353 466 9,8 
Other Extreme Right Parties 31 015 0,1 
In Parodi, Jean-Luc (ed.): Institutions et vie politique. Paris, La Documentation française, 1997, p.168 
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Annexe 3 (Continued) : Parliamentary elections in Metropolitan France 
 
21 March 1993 (1st round) Number of votes % of valid votes 
Extreme Left 432 838 1,7 
Communists 2 273 520 9,1 
Socialists 4 396 109 17,8 
Left Radical 248 597 0,9 
Presidential Majority 376 036 1,5 
Generation Ecology 920 492 3,7 
The Greens 1 023 202 4,1 
Regionalists 68 958 0,3 
Others Left Parties 948 601 3,8 
Rally for the Republic 5 037 382 20,2 
Union for French Democracy 4 812 306 19,4 
Other Right Parties 1 115 457 4,5 
National Front 3 150 764 12,7 
Other Extreme Right Parties 68 364 0,3 
In Parodi, Jean-Luc (ed.): Institutions et vie politique. Paris, La Documentation française, 1997, p.168 
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Annexe 3 (Continued) : Parliamentary elections in Metropolitan France 
 
25 May 1997 (1st round) Number of votes % of valid votes 
Extreme Left 550 106 2,22 
Communists 2 441 375 9,86 
Socialists and Left Radical 6 357 206 25,66 
Movement of Citizens 266 167 1,07 
Other Left Parties 490 124 1,98 
The Greens 907 725 3,66 
Generation Ecology 431 989 1,74 
Other Ecologists 243 726 0,99 
Rally for the Republic 4 084 506 16,49 
Union for French Democracy 3 685 015 14,88 
Independent Right 708 941 2,86 
Other Right Parties 385 960 1,56 
Extreme Right 38 896 0,16 
National Front 3 775 382 15,24 
Others 280 379 1,14 
Union for 4 days a week 122 552 0,49 
In Parodi Jean-Luc (ed.)/ Institutions et vie politique, Paris, La Documentation française, 1997, p. 168 
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Annexe 4: Vote in the 1997 Parliamentary elections by gender and by age, profes-
sion, activity, education, religion, marital status 
Table1: Vote by gender and age (%) 
AGE PC PS Ecolo-
gists 
UDF-
RPR 
FN 
18-24 years:    Men 12 22 7 33 19 
                        Women 9 34 11 29 14 
25-34 years:    Men 9 32 8 25 20 
                         Women 11 27 12 24 18 
35-49 years:    Men            12 35 9 23 15 
                         Women 9 27 12 27 15 
50-64 years:    Men 13 26 3 31 22 
                         Women 7 25 5 45 10 
65 and more:   Men 7 21 3 43 20 
                          Women 9 26 5 51 6 
Source: Sofres/Libération/CEVIPOF survey, 26-31 May 1997, N = 3 010  
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Table 2: Vote by gender and profession (%) 
PROFESSION PC PS Ecolo-
gists 
UDF-
RPR 
FN 
Farmer:   Men 2 28 0 56 4 
                 Women 7 17 0 74 0 
Shopowner, craftsman, 
manager: Men 
 
5 
 
17 
 
1 
 
44 
 
26 
                 Women 9 20 8 44 11 
Executive, professional:    
                 Men 
6 29 6 39 13 
                 Women 5 27 16 39 3 
Middle level manage-
ment :       Men 
 
15 
 
32 
 
6 
 
27 
 
14 
                  Women 9 24 10 44 8 
White-collar workers:    
                  Men 
 
8 
 
30 
 
9 
 
24 
 
25 
                  Women 9 31 8 29 14 
Blue-collar workers: 
                   Men 
 
16 
 
30 
 
6 
 
19 
 
24 
                   Women 11 27 6 29 25 
Source: Sofres/Libération/CEVIPOF survey, 26-31 May 1997, N = 3 010  
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Table 3: Vote by gender and type of activity (%) 
TYPE OF ACTIVITY PC PS Ecolo-
gists 
UDF-
RPR 
FN 
Employed:      Men            12 32 8 25 17 
                        Women 8 28 13 29 14 
Unemployed: Men             11 33 9 17 24 
                        Women 5 37 10 19 10 
Retired:          Men             9 23 3 39 22 
                        Women 8 26 6 51 6 
Housewife (has worked):  15 21 2 33 22 
Housewife (never 
worked): 
5 23 4 45 13 
Student:          Men 10 23 10 38 15 
                         Women 11 33 9 33 9 
Source: Sofres/Libération/CEVIPOF survey, 26-31 May 1997, N = 3 010  
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Table 4: Vote by gender and educational level (%) 
EDUCATIONAL LEVEL PC PS Ecolo-
gists 
UDF-
RPR 
FN 
Primary:           Men 12 27 3 31 21 
                           Women 10 27 6 39 13 
Primary superior: 
                           Men 
 
12 
 
29 
 
7 
 
26 
 
22 
                           Women 8 27 8 33 18 
Baccalaureate:  Men 12 30 7 32 13 
                           Women 10 32 10 34 6 
Bac + 2 years:   Men 8 33 12 30 12 
                           Women 7 23 10 47 4 
University:        Men 6 26 6 37 17 
                           Women 8 27 15 31 6 
Source: Sofres/Libération/CEVIPOF survey, 26-31 May 1997, N = 3 010  
102 France: The Front National 
Table 5: Vote by gender and religion (%) 
RELIGION PC PS Ecolo-
gists 
UDF-
RPR 
FN 
Regularly practicing 
Catholic:       Men 
 
2 
 
11 
 
6 
 
55 
 
16 
                       Women 2 17 6 65 3 
Irregularly practicing 
Catholic:        Men 
 
4 
 
25 
 
4 
 
45 
 
15 
                        Women 5 22 7 45 11 
Non practicing Catholic: 
                        Men 
 
10 
 
29 
 
7 
 
28 
 
21 
                        Women 9 31 8 32 16 
No religion:    Men 21 35 7 14 18 
                        Women 18 34 14 10 16 
Source: Sofres/Libération/CEVIPOF survey, 26-31 May 1997, N = 3 010  
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Table 6 : Vote by gender and marital status (%) 
MARITAL STATUS PC PS Ecolo-
gists 
UDF-
RPR 
FN 
Married:      Men 10 29 5 32 17 
                      Women 8 28 8 38 11 
Cohabitant: Men 16 36 9 18 19 
                      Women 10 27 12 21 22 
Bachelor:     Men 10 26 8 31 19 
                      Women 8 29 13 31 12 
Divorced:     Men 16 26 6 15 29 
                      Women 10 30 15 28 15 
Widow:         Men 8 25 4 32 26 
                       Women 10 23 1 51 9 
Source: Sofres/Libération/CEVIPOF survey, 26-31 May 1997, N = 3 010  
